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Transforming Corporate Governance 
in Chinese Corporations: A Journey, 
Not a Destination 
Andrew Keay and Jingchen Zhao 
Abstract: The article offers a systemic, historical, and rigorous study of the 
transformation of Chinese corporate governance, focusing on its development 
from a totally administrative model, being one which relies on government and 
administrative power and imposes on corporations’ controllers administrative 
duties and objectives, to a hybrid model which has both administrative and eco-
nomic governance characteristics. The article assesses whether administrative 
power will hinder corporate governance transformation in China on its journey 
towards a sound and sustainable model. We opine that the government continues 
to have a key role to play in corporate governance in China which makes admin-
istrative interference and power something that is embedded in corporate gov-
ernance regimes through public and political policies, law enforcement, and 
strategic management policies for corporations. The administrative involvement 
might sacrifice efficiency, and effective market and corporate responses. How-
ever, it is observed that it may bring comparative advantages for Chinese corpo-
rate governance in terms of supporting long term strategic planning and the set-
ting of multiple goals for State Owned Enterprises (SOEs, hereinafter), with 
government interference producing immediate action in order to prevent market 
failure. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
China has achieved unprecedented economic growth since 1980, with 
per capita GDP increasing from one of the lowest in the world to a level 
that is firmly in the middle of the international ranks.1 China has seen the 
advent of economic miracles since opening up policies and reforms that 
were introduced by it in the late 1970s; it has become a global economic 
powerhouse at an incredible speed and has changed international trade and 
investment patterns. The success of China to date has come about without 
key elements that are regarded by Western scholars as essential for long-
term success, such as a well-functioning market, private property rights, an 
efficient and impartial legal system and a shareholder-centred economic 
corporate governance.2 In 1992 the Chinese central government altered its 
policy from seeking to have a “combined planned and market economy” to 
having a “market economy with Chinese characteristics.”3 If the adjective 
“socialist” characterises the political system, the term “market economy” 
clearly guides the direction of the reform goals in China.4 These reforms 
have significantly increased and enhanced the scope of the market, while a 
shift can be seen from central planning to market regulation. It has been ar-
gued that enterprise and economic reform in China since the 1980s has been 
a process that is aimed at establishing a suitable corporate governance 
mechanism.5 A suitable and ideal corporate governance model has not yet 
been developed despite innovative reforms and the undertaking of a variety 
of comparative studies and some empirical research.6 
                                                          
 1 See GDP per Capita (Current US$) 1980–1984 to 2010–2014, THE WORLD BANK,  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=6 (last visited November 1, 
2017). 
 2 Randall Morck & Bernard Yin Yeung, Corporate Governance in China, 26 J. APPLIED 
CORP. FIN. 20, 20 (2014). 
 3 This is a model with a competitive market system in which public ownership predomi-
nates. 
 4 In addition to this fundamental change, the rapid growth of the private economy, joint 
ventures, wholly foreign-owned enterprises, collectively-owned enterprises, farmers’ special 
cooperatives and the corporatisation and reconstruction of state-owned enterprises have 
meant that Chinese business organisations are very diverse, forming a truly “mixed owner-
ship economy”. See GUOLI LIU, The Dialectic Relationship between Peaceful Development 
and China’s Deep Reform, CHINA’S “PEACEFUL RISE” IN THE 21ST CENTURY: DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 23 (Sujian Guo ed., 2006).  
 5 PENG FEI YANG, The Two Models of Corporate Governance and the Institutional Re-
form of Chinese Enterprise, in CHANGING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN CHINA 
AND JAPAN: ADAPTIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN PRACTICES 15 (Masao Nakamura ed., 2008). 
 6 See, e.g., Fuxiu Jiang & Kenneth A. Kim, Corporate Governance in China: A Modern 
Perspective, 32 J. CORP. FIN. 190 (2015); Wei Shen, Qiong Zhou & Chung-Ming Lau, Em-
pirical Research on Corporate Governance in China: A Review and New Directions for the 
Future, 12 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 41 (2016); Stijn Claessens & Joseph P.H. Fan, Corporate 
Governance in Asia: A Survey, 3 INT’L REV. FIN. 71 (2002); Guy S. Liu, Comparative Corpo-
rate Governance: The Experience between China and the UK, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L 
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Chinese corporate governance is clearly distinct from the German-
Japanese insider model, the Anglo-American outsider model or the south-
east/west Asian family-oriented corporate model,7 having moved on from 
learning lessons from the German experience of corporate governance with 
strong employee participation and two-tier boards in the 1980s, to learning 
from the American experience in developing a strong stock market, intro-
ducing a system of independent directors in the 1990s8 and the reform was 
put in force in 2014 with minimum paid-in thresholds completely discard-
ed.9 The transition process of the Chinese corporate governance model is 
one that is ongoing, and is constituted by a hybrid model which has both 
administrative and economic dimensions.10  Both elements of governance 
are expected to coexist and develop to provide an equilibrium in China over 
a long period, during which there will inevitably be various institutional and 
ideological obstacles to be overcome.11 This hybrid model continually 
changes and does so in line with economic growth and the initiation and 
development of a series of reform attempts, primarily dominated by corpo-
ratization and transformation of the role played by the government and the 
Communist Party. It is unlikely that the transition of the corporate govern-
ance model will ultimately lead to a full economic model due to the politi-
cal system which is dominated by a very powerful Communist Party (here-
inafter, the Party) and deeply-rooted traditional factors including the 
devotion to a business regulatory culture, the influence of a dominant ideol-
                                                                                                                                       
REV. 1 (2005); Saul Estrin & Martha Prevezer, The Role of Informal Institutions in Corpo-
rate Governance: Brazil, Russia, India, and China Compared, 28 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 41 
(2011); Ruth V. Aguilera & Gregory Jackson, Comparative and International Corporate 
Governance, 4 ACAD. MGMT. ANNULS 485 (2010).  
 7 Weian Li, Aaichao Qiu & Zhihui Gu, Dual Corporate Governance Environment, Polit-
ical Connections Preference and Firm Performance—Study on Governance Transition of 
China’s Listed Firms (Shuangchong Gongsi Zhili Guanjing, Zhengzhi Lianxi Pianhao Yu 
Gongsi Jixiao), 267 CHINA INDUS. ECON. 85, 85-86 (2010). 
 8 PENG FEI YANG, The Two Models of Corporate Governance and the Institutional Re-
form of Chinese Enterprise, in CHANGING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN CHINA 
AND JAPAN: ADAPTIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN PRACTICES 15 (Masao Nakamura ed., 2008). 
 9 Chinese Company Law 2006, promulgated by The Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, December 28, 2013, Article 27; Company Law 2005, art. 29, now re-
moved by the Company Law put in force in 2014; see also Shuangge Wen & Jingchen Zhao, 
Contextualizing Legal Norms: A Multi-Dimensional View of the 2014 Legal Capital Reform 
in China, 19 EUR. BUS. ORG. LAW REV. (forthcoming). 
 10 For discussions on the hybrid corporate governance model see Jingchen Zhao, The 
Emerging Third Way in the Corporate Objective Debate in Company Law, 62 N. IR. LEGAL 
Q. 361(2011); Ji-Yong Lee, Hybrid Corporate Governance: The Case of Asia, 3 REV. 
CONTEMP. BUS. RES. 21 (2014); ABDUL A. RASHEED & TORU YOSHIKAWA, THE 
CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISE AND PROSPECTS (Abdul A. Rasheed & 
Toru Yoshikawa eds., 2012). 
 11 See WEIAN LI, XIAOHONG CHEN & QINGHONG YUAN, CHINESE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: ROAD TO TRANSITION AND PERFECTION (ZHONGGUO GONGSI ZHILI: 
ZHUANXING YU WANSHAN ZHILU 中国公司治理： 转型与完善之路) 140 (2012). 
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ogy, and China’s long-term preoccupation with state ownership of property 
with its cautious embrace of capitalism accompanied by ownership that in-
volves Chinese characteristics, including a Chinese top-down regulatory 
system.12  
There is evidence that suggests that good corporate governance miti-
gates agency problems, and this is especially needed, in a unique way, in 
the case of China which has double agency problems, namely conflicts be-
tween boards of directors and shareholders and conflicts between control-
ling and minority shareholders. The latter kind of problem can well involve 
state and government agencies.13 These agencies often are the controlling 
shareholders and decision makers as part of their role as representatives of 
the State. They tend to dominate corporate boards in SOEs, and the regula-
tors of corporations and corporate actions. Therefore, discussions of the his-
tory, nature, problems and future of administrative corporate governance 
are particularly important in order to offer a true picture of corporate gov-
ernance. This picture reflects stages of economic development, political 
policies, social needs, international policies, shareholding structure, market 
conditions, financial systems and foreign policies, all of which have had an 
impact on the Chinese economy.14  
China’s economic success and the unique Chinese characteristics of its 
economic development make its transition path an insightful subject with a 
profound impact for researchers, and with, as far as corporate governance 
development is concerned, potential effect for other jurisdictions that have 
emerging markets or even those with mature markets where there is gov-
ernment interference in the content and process of the corporate governance 
scheme. There have been a number of studies addressing the improvement 
of corporate governance in response to problems and troublesome practices 
in China, with many suggestions and recommendations made in order to 
improve effectiveness, accountability, transparency and efficacy of corpo-
rate governance.15 Chinese corporate governance has been described in dif-
                                                          
 12 CHENXIA SHI, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 18-19 
(2012).  
 13 See Qingxiang Yang, On Governance Control of Corporation, WUHAN U. J. (PHIL. & 
SOC. SCI.) 38 (2008); see also YONG ZHANG, LARGE CHINESE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: 
CORPORATIZATION AND STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT (2007).   
 14 This unique nature does not only compromise the independence of corporate boards 
and the efficiency of corporate governance. It may also have positive effects in a jurisdiction 
like China because of its unique economic and historical development and the profound im-
pact of culture on governance, such as a mitigation of the serious information problems 
faced by investors and regulators.   
 15 See, e.g., Qiao Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Current Practices, Economic 
Effects and Institutional Determinants, 52 CESIFO ECON.  STUD. 415 (2006); Lay-Hong Tan 
& Jiangyu Wang, Modeling an Efficient Corporate Governance System for China’s Listed 
State-Owned Enterprises: Issues and Challenges in a Transitional Economy, 7 J. CORP. L. 
STUD. 143 (2007); Yongqiang Gao, Corporate Social Performance in China: Evidence from 
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ferent ways and based on various foci and classifications. This article exam-
ines the transition of corporate governance in China, with a special focus on 
the nature, problems and necessity of administrative governance. It assesses 
whether administrative power will hinder corporate governance transfor-
mation in China on its journey towards a sound and sustainable model. If 
there are unavoidable barriers which reflect deeply rooted views within 
China’s political system, as well as China’s culture, history and sharehold-
ing structure, should administrative governance be seen as a positive ad-
vantage that is useful, necessary and functional under the current economic 
development stage in China? In order to be able to do this, we offer an in-
depth analysis of corporate governance transition in China on its route from 
an administrative governance model to a hybrid one with elements of both 
administrative and economic governance, and a critical examination of the 
role played by administrative power that has been wielded by the govern-
ment in shaping corporate governance.  The article aims to address the fol-
lowing questions to construct a coherent assessment.  What are the charac-
teristics and nature of administrative power in relation to the development 
of Chinese corporate governance? What is the role of administrative gov-
ernance historically in the transformation of corporate governance and what 
are the reasons for this transformation? And finally, in what way could cor-
porate governance in China take advantage of administrative governance if 
it were to coexist with market forces in China indefinitely? To address these 
questions, historical and doctrinal methods will be used to scrutinize and 
explain administrative factors shaping the path of corporate governance in 
China.  
This article includes an exploration of the nature and function of ad-
ministrative governance as far as it relates to the “Beijing Consensus.”16 
The Consensus is also referred to as the “China Model” and is regarded as 
the political and economic policies of China and the concept alludes to the 
                                                                                                                                       
Large Companies, 89 J. BUS. ETHICS 23 (2009); HENRY WAI-CHUNG YEUNG, CHINESE 
CAPITALISM IN A GLOBAL ERA: TOWARDS HYBRID CAPITALISM (2004); Kun Luen Alex Lau & 
Angus Young, Why China Shall Not Completely Transit from a Relation Based to a Rule 
Based Governance Regime: A Chinese Perspective, 21 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 577 
(2013); RICHARD MEAD, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT: CROSS-CULTURAL DIMENSIONS 
(2005); Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Corporate Governance in China, 26 J. CORP. FIN. 
20 (2014); Jingjing Yang, Jing Chi, & Martin Young, A Review of Corporate Governance in 
China, 25 ASIAN-PAC. ECON. LIT. 15 (2011). 
 16 See S. PHILIP HSU, YU-SHAN WU & SUISHENG ZHAO, IN SEARCH OF CHINA’S 
DEVELOPMENT MODEL: BEYOND THE BEIJING CONSENSUS (2011); Scott Kennedy, The Myth 
of the Beijing Consensus, 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 461 (2010); Shaun Breslin, The ‘China 
Model’ and the Global Crisis: From Friedrich List to a Chinese Mode of Governance?, 87 
INT’L AFF. 1323 (2011); Barry Naughton, China’s Distinctive System: Can it Be a Model for 
Others?, 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 437 (2010); see also QIAO LIU, CORPORATE CHINA 2.0: THE 
GATE SHAKEUP (2016); Randall Peerenboom, A New China Model for the Era Post Global 
Financial Crisis: Legal Dimensions, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN LAW 54 (Christoph 
Antons  ed., 2017). 
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putative generalizability of the defining characteristics drawn from China’s 
overall development experience. The notion has attracted many admirers 
and led to numerous debates in recent years. The article goes beyond cur-
rent discussions on corporate governance in China which tend to focus on 
the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the current model and the possibili-
ties of adopting the experiences of Anglo-American or German-Japanese 
models in order to reform SOEs, corporate law and government policy. The 
research has significant implications for policy makers both within and be-
yond the Asia-Pacific region and to enable us to better understand and deal 
with a globalized, value-pluralised model. An in-depth analysis of the ad-
ministrative power will significantly aid policy makers in assessing the ap-
propriateness of existing regulatory methods in relation to administrative 
governance; and shaping new regulatory trajectories, and how to apply ad-
ministrative governance more effectively and fairly in China.  
The economic development in China has been, and continues to be, 
one of the most significant developments in the world. An in-depth under-
standing of the nature of administrative corporate governance is important 
and should be essential for a broad range of people and including legal 
practitioners, in-house counsel who have to deal with corporate governance, 
and legal and business theorists who should realize the development of cor-
porate governance in China is a journey with an uncertain direction. The re-
search should be relevant not only to Chinese corporations, and especially 
listed ones, but also to foreign corporations wishing to engage in business 
relations with Chinese corporations to enable them to better understand and, 
possibly, accommodate administrative influence on corporate governance 
and thus equip them to do business in China in a fairer and more efficient 
manner. The focus of the article, administrative and government involve-
ment and interference, is difficult to understand and even appears mysteri-
ous to western readers.  The research aims to fill the gap so that board 
members, legal practitioners, academics and directors are aware of the func-
tions, challenges and risks of administrative governance in a contemporary 
context rather than just simply linking those elements to the planned econ-
omy or government control of corporate decisions. The research will also 
help to determine how an appropriate corporate governance mechanism 
should be structured and developed and how it would tie in with current 
government policies and parties’ plans.  
The article proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we offer important back-
ground in the form of introductory discussions on economic and administra-
tive corporate governance. In Section 3 and Section 4 we undertake a criti-
cal analysis of the history of China’s transformation since economic reform 
which commenced in 1979, and this includes consideration of some internal 
and external pressures leading to this transition. Section 5 explores the op-
portunities of taking advantages of inevitable administrative governance, 
which may have wider implication for and impact on other jurisdictions 
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which have emerging markets.17 Section 6 explores the features unique to 
the Chinese hybrid corporate governance model, the focus being on an 
analysis of administrative involvement in this system. Finally, there are 
some concluding remarks. 
II. INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Economic corporate governance involves governance that is rooted in 
economic considerations. The central idea remains constant—the primacy 
of private and contractual solutions for reducing agency costs. For instance, 
in Anglo-American systems there tend to be a focus on the economic power 
of corporations, and as far as many corporations are concerned, this in-
volves the directors running the corporation so that it can make as much 
profit as possible, and in such a way as to lead to the maximization of the 
shareholder wealth. The corporation is viewed as a contractually-based, 
profit-maximizing entity founded on this norm. Therefore, traditionally in 
these jurisdictions directors’ duties are exclusively owed to the corporation, 
and the maximization of the wealth of the shareholders is the fundamental 
purpose of their fiduciary duties.18 According to efficiency theory, it is more 
efficient if directors run corporations with the aim of maximising share-
holder wealth since the least cost is expended in doing this. The directors 
can work more efficiently if they are focused on one objective only,19 with-
                                                          
 17 See Stijn Claessens & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, Corporate Governance in Emerging Mar-
kets: A Survey, 15 EMERGING MKT. REV. 1 (2013); Joseph P.H. Fan, K.C. John Wei & Xin-
zhong Xu, Corporate Finance and Governance in Emerging Markets: A Selective Review 
and an Agenda for Future Research, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 207 (2011); Jingchen Zhao, Promoting 
a More Efficient Corporate Governance Model in Emerging Markets through Corporate 
Law, 15 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 447 (2016). 
 18 Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: the Role of Shareholder Prima-
cy, J. CORP. L. 637 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: the Means and Ends 
of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003); Stephen. M. Bainbridge, In De-
fence of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder 
Value: A New Ideology for Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 13 (2000); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439 
(2001); SHUANGGE WEN, SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LEGAL 
ASPECTS, PRACTICES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS (2013).  
 19 Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 27, 56–57 (1996); see also Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: 
The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637 (2006); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-
So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002); Michael C. 
Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2001); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value? J. 
FIN. ECON. 525 (2001); Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J. L. 
ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence 
Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002); Laura Lin, The 
Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and 
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out any unpoliced managerial discretion.20 Besides, in contractarian theory, 
which arguably underpins the nature of the corporation in Anglo-American 
jurisdictions, the contracts between the firm and its shareholders are implic-
it as all these contracts simply amount to a claim on the corporation’s resid-
ual cash flow.21 In Anglo-American corporations, there is now arguably a 
greater concern over corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues. Consider-
ation is also given to the social, environmental, as well as the economic, of-
ten known as “the triple bottom line,” but clearly economic concerns still 
predominate. Under the economic model there is no room for government 
intervention in private transactions between corporations and their stake-
holders, and corporations rely more on stock and bond markets for external 
financing. It is believed that a contractual rather than a mandatory model of 
corporate governance is optimal for achieving economic efficiency, and the 
market should prevail in shaping the structure of corporate governance.22 
The model prevails in many common law countries with an effective legal 
enforcement of shareholder rights, but aspects of the model have been ap-
plied around the world. Corporate law under this model provides relatively 
extensive protections for shareholders, and courts are also relatively active 
in enforcing those protections. Corporate law is designed out of economic 
consideration for corporate development and survival, rather than with the 
objective of fairness or paternalism in mind.23 
Administrative corporate governance has its own different characteris-
tics which involves various forms of government and administrative inter-
ference and participation. As the article demonstrates, China began its jour-
ney with a totally administrative corporate governance framework. The 
characteristics of administrative corporate governance can be observed in 
relation to share ownership, corporate control, and corporate objective and 
the result being profit distribution, which is typical in those jurisdictions 
with elements of a planned economy. First, administrative corporate gov-
ernance is always connected with the ownership of shares by the govern-
ment and the historical dominance of SOEs in which the state owns the 
shares and controls the companies with what is often seen as a detrimental 
presence. SOEs have been rising in influence in the global economy over 
the past decade and based on a study by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
SOEs increased from 3% of all companies in 2005 to 15% in 2014.24 De-
                                                                                                                                       
Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898 (1996). 
 20 Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, The Corporate Objective Revisited, 15 ORG. 
SCI. 350, 354 (2004). 
 21 Id. at 355. 
 22 Frank H. Easterbrook, International Corporate Differences: Markets or Law?, 9 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 23 (1997).  
 23 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISHCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW, vii (3d. ed. 1991).  
 24 PWC, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: CATALYSTS FOR PUBLIC VALUE CREATION? (2015), 
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spite the fact that the percentage of listed SOEs has dropped in China from 
74.86% to 37.88 % in the period from 2003 to 2014, they still function as a 
crucial part of China’s economy, carrying great economic weight by consti-
tuting 64.36% of the total market capitalization.25 To date over 150,000 
SOEs are active at the national and local level, with half of listed corpora-
tions under government control. These SOEs also seem to do relatively well 
in global competition: they control an astronomical $690 billion in assets 
abroad, with forty-seven centrally-owned firms ranked in the Fortune Glob-
al 500 of 2016.26   
Secondly, the dominance of state ownership always lead to control-
based corporate governance. Therefore, the corporate objective is subject to 
the interference of government and political policies. Many listed compa-
nies, especially SOEs, do accommodate objectives other than profit maxi-
mization and these might include administrative goals. Apart from making 
profits, these corporations have other more immediate administrative mis-
sions such as the maintenance of urban employment, other social and envi-
ronmental purposes or various administrative tasks required by the China 
Securities and Regulation Commission (CSRC) in order to regulate China’s 
stock market. Administrative interference aims to serve the state’s interests 
and strategic plans by controlling or influencing multifarious issues of busi-
ness operation.27 The administrative approach stems from the government 
policy in maintaining a full or controlling ownership in corporations so as 
to achieve direct control of key industries such as energy, banking, and tele-
communications.28  Furthermore, it can entail direct involvement in up-
stream industries due to their strategic importance in sustaining the growth 
of downstream industries.  
Corporations subject to administrative power pursue the often-
conflicting goals of maximizing profits on the one hand and contributing to 
national welfare, on the other.29 Connecting with its unique corporate objec-
                                                                                                                                       
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/psrc/publications/assets/pwc-state-owned-enterprise-psrc.pdf. 
 25 T.J. Wong, Corporate Governance Research on Listed Firms in China: Institutions, 
Governance and Accountability, 9 FOUND. & TRENDS IN ACCT. 259, 271-72 (2014).  
 26 WENDY LEUTERT & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, CHINA’S STATE ENTERPRISE REFORM: 
BIGGER, YES, BUT BETTER? FULL TEXT, (2015) http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/04/23/ 
chinas-state-enterprise-reform-bigger-yes-but-better/. 
 27 Harry X. Wu, Accounting for the Sources of Growth in Chinese Industry 1980-2010, 
DEPENDING REFORM FOR CHINA’S LONG-TERM GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 431, 432-33 
(Ligang Song, Ross Garnaut & Cai Fang eds., 2014). 
 28 Qiao Liu & Zhou Lu, Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in the Chi-
nese Listed Companies: A Tunneling Perspective, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 881, 884 (2007); see also 
Lilian Soares Outtes Wanderley, Rafael Lucian, Francisca Farache & José Milton de Sousa 
Filho, CSR Information Disclosure on the Web: A Context-Based Approach Analysing the 
Influence of Country of Origin and Industry Sector, 82 J. BUS. ETHICS 369 (2008). 
 29 Zhaofeng Wang, Corporate Governance under State Control: The Chinese Experi-
ence, 13 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 487, 488 (2012).  
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tive, the decisions relating to CSR, rather than being voluntary in nature, 
may be a part of orders given to corporations by government or be part of 
their corporate mission as constituting an element of political strategy. 
Many listed corporations in China are carve-outs or spin-offs from large 
SOEs which were set up after the establishment of the Chinese stock ex-
changes in the early 1990s. Therefore, they share personnel functions, capi-
tal, and assets with their parent corporations.30 Their corporate strategy and 
profit distributions are closely related to the needs of administrative plan-
ning and policy, and their board members always have a close relationship 
with the government and civil servants. It is argued by Mead that the mode 
of corporate governance in China, in relation to the administrative ap-
proach, can be accurately described as “patrimonialism,” a combination of 
paternalism, hierarchical order, mutual obligation, familialism, and person-
alism.31 Under administrative governance, government at all levels act as a 
guardian of the public and an arbitrator in organizing enterprise interests 
and social interests to effectively supervise SOEs in fulfilling their CSR by 
way of administrative intervention and economic control. 
A good example of the administrative corporate governance approach 
in China was the quota system that was introduced officially from 1993 to 
2000 and which continued to exist on a de facto basis until 2002. This sys-
tem relied on decentralized administrative governance as a key feature of 
market management during the transition period. The quota system served 
two functions while it operated, including mitigating the serious infor-
mation problems faced by regulators and investors and incentivizing local 
bureaucrats to select viable corporations.32 From 1993 to 2000 the CSRC 
had a quota on the number of corporate listings in any given period. It as-
signed control of this to the planning commission at the provincial level, 
and the commission distributed listings to initial public offering (IPO) can-
didates, and corporate restructuring was also organised in a way that was 
based on the actual quota an IPO firm obtained.33 This was a system that 
involved allocating critical resources among the regions of China, and the 
annual quota for each region was established during intense bargaining be-
tween regional governments and relevant central agencies. The system 
played an important role in the era of economic development that was dom-
                                                          
 30 Qiao Liu & Zhou Lu, Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in the Chi-
nese Listed Companies: A Tunnelling Perspective, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 881, 885 (2007). 
 31 S. GORDON REDDING, THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE CAPITALISM (1990). 
 32 David A. Caragliano, Administrative Governance as Corporate Governance: A Partial 
Explanation for the Growth of China’s Stock Markets, 30 MICH. J. INT’L 1273, 1311 (2009).  
 33 Qiao Liu & Zhou Lu, Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in the Chi-
nese Listed Companies: A Tunnelling Perspective, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 881, 884 (2007); see also 
Qiao Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Current Practices, Economic Effects and Institu-
tional Determinants, 52 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 415 (2006); Joseph P.H. Fan, T.J. Wong & 
Tianyu Zhang, Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO Perfor-
mance of China’s Newly Partially Privatized Firms, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 330 (2007). 
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inated by the planned economy. It was regarded as a basic feature of re-
gional economic management prior to and during the Chinese economic re-
form process.34 It facilitated ordered market entry so that the government 
could, on one hand, maintain certain levels of controlling power over the 
size and stability of the stock market, and on the other, assure an appropri-
ate level of equity financing for the state sector.35 However, the system also 
generated problems. It provided opportunities for corruption and enabled 
local bureaucrats to have “rent-seeking” opportunities as the local bureau-
crats selected the corporations to be IPO candidates and this created the 
chance for the officials to extract benefits from expectant corporations. Ad-
ditionally, through the aforementioned control the government manipulated 
the market. From 2000, the system was abandoned in order to foster the 
market economy. Therefore, it is clear that the trajectory of administrative 
governance in China varies and depends on many factors, such as govern-
ment policies and the state of economic development.   
III. HISTORICAL PROGRESS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE TRANSITION IN CHINA  
In this part, some of the major milestones and key transformative is-
sues will be discussed in terms of the development of corporate governance 
in China in order to identify reasons for, and evidence of, transition and to 
demonstrate the kind of transition that has occurred. 
Pre-1978 
Before 1978, only the system of administrative governance existed. 
SOEs largely operated under the centrally-planned economy and these cor-
porations were managed by the committee of factory management, consist-
ing of the head of the factory, management staff, and employee representa-
tives.36  However, the arrangement was abolished after the state launched 
the first five-year plan to carry out socialist transformation where private 
capital was integrated into public ownership pursuant to the basic Soviet 
development model of command planning.37 Under this model, resource al-
location decisions were made in response to command from government 
planners in the administrative hierarchy instead of responding to the market. 
The distinct characteristics of this model was discussed by Prybyla as hav-
                                                          
 34 Zhiwu Chen, Capital Markets and Legal Development: The China Case, 14 CHINA 
ECON. REV. 451, 454 (2003). 
 35 Caragliano, supra note 33, at 1313.  
 36 Article 2 7, Decree on Establishment of Factory Management Committee in State-
operated and Public-operated Factories (Guanyu guoying, gongyinggongchang jianli 
gongchang guanli weiyuanhui de zhishi,  
关于国营、公营工厂建立工厂管理委员会的指示), 1950.  
 37 KUOTSAI  TOM LIOU, MANAGING ECONOMIC REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 9-28 
(1998). 
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ing vertical information flows, centralised coordination and property, and 
limited and concentrated participation in economic decisions.38 SOEs were, 
under the model, not independent commercial entities and were owned by 
the people and functioned as tools by the government in order to deliver 
economic strategies and business management.39 They were employed as 
branches or affiliates of government departments under highly centralised 
and planned management.40 Prior to 1978, administrative governance was 
characterized by features such as public ownership,41 state plan-directed 
production activities, price controls with a system of commodity allocation, 
and state investment and financial control systems.42 The lack of an effi-
cient market economy mechanism and the contribution by the private sector 
of only 22% to China’s total industrial output at the time characterised the 
Chinese economy throughout this period.43    
1978 to 1986 
Following the cultural revolution that attacked all forms of traditional 
Chinese culture, including the Chinese economy, 1978 was regarded as a 
key turning point in the development of the economy when the government 
adopted policies that encouraged greater autonomy for SOEs and granted 
more decision-making power to the management team, in line with the 
commencement of economic reform and the implementation of the opening 
up process.44 As for corporate governance in China, a top-down approach 
was implemented by the Party in order to initiate the reform in late 197845 
and this approach has been dominant, being a logical result of the absolute 
leadership by the Party in China and its determined desire to build a social-
ist market economy.46 More than 4,000 SOEs were selected for a pilot 
                                                          
 38 See JAN S. PRYBYLA, REFORM IN CHINA AND OTHER SOCIALIST ECONOMIES (1990); JAN 
S. PRYBYLA, ISSUES IN SOCIALIST ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION (1990). 
 39 CHENXIA SHI, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATES GOVERNANCES IN CHINA 
116–117 (2012). 
 40 SHENG HONG & ZHAO NONG, CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE: NATURE 
PERFORMANCE AND REFORM 1 (2013). 
 41 This includes pre-dominant state ownership and collective ownership. 
 42 Allen Huang & Chang Xun, China, in FINANCING REPORTING IN THE PACIFIC ASIA 
REGION (Ronald Ma ed., 1997).  
 43 Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in 
China, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 57 (2005). 
 44 See 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Community Party Central Committee, PEOPLE’S 
DAILEY (24 December 1978), http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/content_ 
697755.htm.  
 45 This top-down approach required the Party’s endorsement for corporate governance 
related plans and proposals, before being introduced as enforceable regulation by the Na-
tional People’s Congress (NPC) or its Standing Committee. Conversely, a bottom-up ap-
proach would be one based on free choice in a market economy. 
 46 JANE FU, CORPORATE DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 6 (2010). 
01. KEAY&ZHAO - CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINESE CORPORATIONS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2018  11:51 AM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 38:187 (2018) 
200 
scheme that saw them subject to reforms including emphasis on SOE au-
tonomy and profiting sharing.47 SOEs started to have certain rights to plan 
and manag,e as well as to retain a portion of profits. The government intro-
duced an economic accountability system in 1981, which offered more au-
tonomous power to enterprises to allow them to become independent eco-
nomic units, responsible, and accountable for their own profits and losses.48 
The reforms were carried out without contravening the original framework 
of a planned economy.49 The main purpose of the changes introduced in this 
period offered corporations control rights over their corporate decisions and 
the operation of firms. It also gave employees and directors (factory heads) 
incentives and the right to make profits for enterprises to improve output 
and ensure revenue growth.50  
1987-1992  
In 1987, the Thirteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China proposed the introduction of the joint-stock system. As a result, the 
property rights of small SOEs could be transferred to collectives or individ-
uals. Since the late 1980s, the emergence and increasing acceptance of a 
basic economic and legal entity was accompanied by a series of financial 
reforms that replaced state budgetary grants. Stock markets were estab-
lished, with the two official stock exchanges being equipped for operation 
by creating a new government body, the CSRC, to regulate them. A major 
step in the evolution of the economy was government policy on “separating 
control from ownership” which, in certain ways, represented the end of the 
planned economy in China and the start of economic restructuring.51 The 
provision of a two-track system can be also observed in legislation.52 It is 
clear that the relevant authorities still retained residual power as far as im-
portant decision-making was concerned,53 but it prohibited the state and its 
                                                          
 47 This was introduced by the State Council through “The Regulations on the Expansion 
of Operational Management Autonomy for State-Owned Industrial Enterprises” and “the 
Regulations on Retention of Profits by State-Owned Enterprises; in 1979. See Regulations 
on the expansion of the state-owned enterprise management autonomy (Guanyu kuoda guoy-
ingqiye jingying guanli zizhu gaige ruogan guiding 
关于扩大国营企业经营管理自主改革若干规定). 
 48 State-owned enterprises on the provisions of retained earnings (Guanyu guoying qiye 
shixing lirunliucheng de guiding 关于国营企业实行利润留成的规定). 
 49 Regulations such as the “Interim Regulation on the Employee’s Congress of SOEs” 
was enacted in 1982 and the “Interim Regulation on SOEs” was enacted in 1983.   
 50 Hong, supra note 39, at 3.  
 51 Joseph P.H. Fan, T.J. Wong & Tianyu Zhang, The Emergence of Corporate Pyramids 
in China, (CTR. ECON. INST., Working Paper No.2006-3), http://ideas.repec.org/p/hit/ 
hitcei/2006-3.html; See also Stijin Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Sep-
aration of Ownership in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81 (2000).  
 52 Enterprise Law was introduced in 1988 as the first codified law for SOEs. 
 53 [Law of Industrial Enterprises Owned](promulgated by Order No. 3 of the President of 
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organs from encroaching on the autonomy of SOEs in their organization of 
production and the managing of the business.54 In addition, policies, rules, 
and regulations for protecting the non-state owned sector55 provide a legal 
guarantee for the development of the non-state owned sector. Despite these 
reforms introduced in the regulation of SOEs and steps being taken to grad-
ually subject SOEs to market forces, the ownership pattern remained largely 
unchanged during that period.56  However, it is fair to say that a hybrid sys-
tem, including both administrative and market-based corporate governance, 
was under development in China at this stage. 
Modern Enterprise System after 1992 
In November 1993 following Deng’s southern tour,57 the Third Plenary 
Session of the Fourteenth National Congress of the Community Party of 
China passed the “Decision on Several Issues for Establishing a Socialist 
Market Economy System by the Central Committee of the CPC,” which 
stated that the “market was to play a fundamental role concerning the re-
sources under macro control by the State.”58 After 1992, we see the emer-
gence of a modern enterprise structure via legal reform, with the introduc-
tion of the first company and securities law in 1993, which confirmed the 
legal bases for non-SOEs and set out the rights and responsibilities of cor-
porations as separate legal entities, boards of directors, and shareholders’ 
general meetings. After these two pieces of legislation were put in force, 
three periods followed which marked the start of the evolution of a modern 
corporate governance system. The first one focused on incorporatization 
and securitization reform (1992–1999), the second one on capital market 
development, and the third on implementing best corporate governance 
practices.59 An important “decision” was adopted in 1999,60 identifying 
                                                                                                                                       
the People’s Republic of China., April 13, 1988, effective Aug. 1, 1988), art. 55, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200303/20030300072563.shtml 
(Such as issuing a unified mandatory plan, appointing, and approving the appointment of the 
factory head (directors) and management).  
 54 Article 58, Law of Industrial Enterprises Owned.  
 55 Such as the Interim Regulations for the Administration of Urban and Rural Individual 
Industrial and Commercial Businesses, the Law of Foreign Invested Enterprises, and the 
Provisional Regulations of Private Enterprises were successively promulgated. 
 56 Wei Shen, Qiong Zhou & Chung-Ming Lau, Empirical Research on Corporate Gov-
ernance in China: A Review and New Directions for Future, 12 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 41, 43 
(2016).  
 57 On his Southern tour in 1992, Deng Xiaoping gave a series of speeches that are regard-
ed as keynote addresses that signaled the beginning of the marketization of China’s econo-
my. 
 58 See CPC Central Committee’s Decision on Several Issues for Establishing a Socialist 
Market Economy System 1993.  
 59 Jane Fu, CORPORATE DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 12 (2010). 
 60 See the Fourth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s 15th Central Committee in 
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corporate governance as the core element of the modern enterprise system. 
During this period the market oriented economy started to play an increas-
ingly important role, with 75% of industrial output being contributed by the 
private sector and, by 1999, these sectors employed more than 70% of non-
agricultural employees.61  
Since the advent of the new Chinese Company Law 2005 and its 
amendment in 2013, corporate governance developments in China have en-
tered a new phase where effective corporate governance mechanisms and 
practices have become a necessary condition to achieving sustainable and 
enduring prosperity in the context of a globally competitive market econo-
my.62 All in all, a wide range of modern corporate governance mechanisms 
and practices have been adopted and adapted in China, which aim to keep 
corporate governance and law development consistent with its rapid eco-
nomic transformation and development, such as independent directors,63 
supervisory boards,64 and CSR.65  However, inherent systemic problems 
remain, which hinder the effectiveness and efficiency of a sound corporate 
governance framework. In particular, the latest corporate law reform, in-
volving the abolition of minimal capital,66 suggested that the Chinese were 
ready for a bigger dose of market liberalism because regulations that im-
peded the entry of new firms or restricted competition were abolished. Ech-
oing the powerful rhetoric of aligning Chinese corporate law more closely 
with that of other developed economies, much scholarly ink has been 
spilled in China. These scholars commended this legislative change as the 
“legal cornerstone underpinning China’s future economic development,”67 
and advocated its effectiveness in prompting the growth of the private 
economy. Further, many also see this legislative change as an infusion of 
Anglo-American liberal market values, because it is portrayed as being bor-
                                                                                                                                       
September 1999. 
 61 Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in 
China, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 57 (2005). 
 62 On Kit Tam & Celina Ping Yu, China Corporate Governance Development, in 
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: COUNTRY ANALYSES 223, 223 
(Chris A. Mallin, 2nd edn., 2011). 
 63 Chinese Company Law 2006, promulgated by The Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, December 28, 2013, Article 122. 
 64 Chinese Company Law 2006, promulgated by The Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, December 28, 2013, Articles 51-55. 
 65 Chinese Company Law 2006, promulgated by The Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, December 28, 2013, Article 5. 
 66 See the codified Company Law 2006 in 2013 (updated Article 26 and deletion of origi-
nal 27(3) and 29). 
 67 Junhai Liu, The 2013 New Company Law is the Legal Cornerstone of China’s Eco-
nomic Development, (2013 Nian Xingongsifa Shi Dazao Zhongguo Jingji Shengjiban de Falv 
Jishi) (2013 年新公司法是打造中国经济“升级版”的法律基石) (May 12, 2014),  
http://lad.ccpit.org/second/index.aspx?nodeid=47&page=ContentPage&contentid=1777 
(emphasis added). 
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rowed from the U.S. legal capital regime.68 These issues have their roots in 
administrative involvement or overly strong administrative power in the 
Chinese corporate governance system. Some examples include: negative 
consequences emanating from the dominance of state ownership of many 
listed corporations, the role of big state-owned banks and their influence on 
corporations, poor discourse and monitoring processes due to the relation-
ship between boards of directors and government officials, and the weak en-
forcement of laws. These issues require us to reconsider the function, draw-
backs, and challenges of administrative corporate governance, including the 
role played by the government and Party organizations, and issues of multi-
ple regulators, corporate culture, and corporate objectives.69  
Chinese corporate governance is moving towards a modernized model, 
following the principles formulated by the OECD and the introduction of 
regulatory changes and new rules that affect corporate governance practices 
in China. The reform policy is to reduce the role of government planning, 
and make sure the market plays a more important and active role, with the 
hope that it will cure China’s enduring problems of administrative interfer-
ence and multiple lines of command over economic activities. The corpo-
rate law legislation has been reviewed and amended in order to ensure that 
corporations are regarded as separate legal entities. The main goal of the 
transition is to build a governance system that is able to provide motivation 
for investment, adequate restraint and monitoring of management, and pro-
mote the optimal use of resources for wealth creation.70 Against the back-
drop of the Law and Development Movement, which has dominated in past 
decades, and sought to promote an international order of economic and so-
cial institutions similar to those in more advanced economies,71 some schol-
ars suggest that the first and foremost purpose of such burgeoning borrow-
ing activities in China is to prepare for the international unification of law 
                                                          
 68 Id.; Junhai Liu, A Proposal to Reform the Company Law and Securities Act Simultane-
ously (Jianyi Gongsifa yu Zhengquanfa Liandong Xiugai 
建议《公司法》与《证券法》联动修改) 4 LEGAL FORUM (2013). 
 69 Addressing these issues takes place in relation to the emerging Chinese economy 
which was the world’s largest goods economy by 2014 (China ‘overtakes’ US as world’s 
largest goods trader, BBC (Jan. 10, 2014),  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-25678415),  
the second largest consumer economy by 2013,  possessed the largest foreign reserves by 
2009 (The World’s Second Biggest Consumer, THE ECONOMIST (February 18th 2014),  
http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2014/02/chinas-econom),  and the second largest 
world economy overall by 2011 with annual GDP growth rates of 9–10 per cent for 30 years 
(China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Largest Economy, THE GUARDIAN (FEB. 14, 
2011), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/feb/14/china-second-largest-economy). 
 70 Jian Chen, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 25 (2005). 
 71 Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East 
Asia 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 829, 829 (2000); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-
Development Studies 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 470, 471 (1995). 
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amid globalization.72 The transition process entails changing the corporate 
objective and the management team appointment process, identifying new 
capital sources, reallocating resources and shifting away from state monop-
oly control to mixed and shared control in order to facilitate fairness, pre-
dictability, and business confidence.73 Despite the fact that policy-makers 
may have favoured an economic model in principle at the beginning of the 
planned reform,74 the reality has been the evolution of a dynamic hybrid 
model that changes  with economic advancement,  and legal and cultural 
development in Chinese society as a whole.  
IV. REASONS FOR TRANSITION 
As China enters a more advanced phase with a transformed corporate 
governance system, following the introduction of adjustments and the pro-
vision of corporate governance reforms, it not only faces opportunities for 
development as the result of external pressure and globalization, but also 
challenges to the preservation and strengthening of its reform policies. The 
reasons for the transformation are based on the following elements. 
Corporatization 
China’s corporate governance reform is aimed at transforming tradi-
tional SOEs into modern, competitive firms operating on a market basis, 
which has been regarded as the core element of continuing economic liber-
alization and structural reforms.75 Early attempts at the reform of SOEs did 
not solve the inefficiency problems of Chinese corporate governance be-
cause of their limited focus on managerial incentives and autonomous ex-
pansion, without addressing or challenging fundamental ownership con-
cerns. The corporatization process in China took place in multiple stages, in 
the 1990s, 2000, and 2014.76  It is regarded as a part of economic reform in 
which stock markets are seen as an alternative to bank lending as ways of 
providing new sources of capital to the state sector. With the endorsement 
                                                          
 72 Kahn-Freund has identified three prime purposes of legal transplantation, namely, 
“first, with the object of preparing the international unification of the law, secondly, with the 
object of giving adequate legal effect to a social change shared by the foreign country with 
one’s own country, and thirdly, with the object of promoting at home a social change which 
foreign law is designed either to express or to produce.” O. Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Mis-
uses of Comparative Law 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 27 (1974) at 2. 
 73 Roman Tomasic, Company Law Implementation in the PRC: The Rule of Law in the 
Shadow of the State, 15 J. CORP. L. STUD. 285, 285 (2015).  
 74 Jian Chen, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 61 (2005).  
 75 LENG JING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REFORM IN CHINA’S TRANSITION 
ECONOMY 2 (2009).  
 76 See Gabriel Wildau, China Kicks off Second Round of Corporatisation, FIN.TIMES 
(Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ec28674c-13ac-11e4-84b7-00144feabdc0.html# 
axzz3DOzmmx3b. 
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of the Fourteenth National Congress of the Party in 1993, forms of owner-
ship by the State were diversified, private and foreign investors entered the 
market, and a modernized corporate governance framework for SOEs was 
introduced. Thousands of poorly performing national and regional SOEs 
were privatized or liquidated.77  
China’s corporatization reform is regarded as a complicated and inter-
active process because official ideologies, national policies, and the inter-
ests of the involved parties have become intertwined in a dynamic man-
ner.78 This process transforms corporate governance, especially in terms of 
the government and administrative involvement. With the first serious at-
tempt at SOE reform, which commenced in the early 1990s, the government 
tackled ownership reform in the SOE sector, and aimed to diversify the 
ownership structure of SOEs, by transforming them into corporations, lim-
ited by shares, with an economic corporate governance structure. The most 
direct method of corporatisation was the split-share structure that granted 
legitimate trading rights to the state-owned shares of listed SOEs.79 This 
was a process where a certain percentage of an SOE’s shares were held by 
the government, but it enabled the SOE to go public by issuing minority 
tradable shares to investors, which opened China for corporatization. The 
reason for reorganizing the shareholding structure in a split-share structure 
was to retain government control over corporations, but allow for market 
mechanisms to influence and discipline corporations at the same time.80 
This split maintained certain degrees of government and administrative in-
volvement in listed SOEs after reform. There was mixed share ownership in 
tradable and non-tradable shares co-existing in listed corporations, and in-
creased involvement of market power in the capitalization of corporations. 
The launch of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets made the trading 
of shares possible for listed corporations. The launch also represented a sig-
nificant step towards market-oriented corporate governance reform and cor-
                                                          
 77 Id. 
 78 Chao Xi, Book Review of Yong Zhang, Large Chinese State-Owned Enterprises: Cor-
poratization and Strategic Development, Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
2008, 197 THE CHINA Q. 217, 218 (2009). 
 79 Li Liao, Bibo Liu & Hao Wang, China’s Secondary Privatization: Perspectives from 
the Split-Share Structure Reform, 113 J. FIN.  ECON. 500, 500 (2014). 
 80 Henk. Berkman, Rebel A. Cole & Lawrence J. Fu, Improving Corporate Governance 
where the State is the Controlling Block Holder: Evidence from China, 20 EUROPEAN J. FIN. 
752 (2014); see also Qian Sun & Wilson H.S. Tong, China Share Issues Privatization: the 
Extent of its Success, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 188 (2003); Michael A. Firth & Oliver M. Rui, Does 
One Size Fit All? A Study of the Simultaneous Relations among Ownership, Corporate Gov-
ernance Mechanisms and the Financial Performance of Firms in China, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: RECENT DEVELOPMENT AND NEW TRENDS (Sabri Boubaker, Bang Dang Ngu-
yen & Duc Khuong Nguyen eds., 2012); Kehan Xu, Laszlo Tihanyi & Michael A. Hitt, Firm 
Resources, Government Power and Privatization, 20 J. MGMT. 1 (2014); Young-Sam Kang 
& Byung-Yeon Kim, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from the Chi-
nese Corporate Reform, 23 CHINA ECON. REV. 471 (2012). 
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poratisation in China, as it represented one of the main events that marked 
the transformation from a purely administrative model to a hybrid one. In 
this hybrid model, the government aimed to promote SOEs output, profits, 
and more efficient employment patterns with the involvement of market 
power and participation of private and foreign investments. The stock mar-
kets served as a conduit to channel the investment of domestic citizens and 
passive foreign investors into the ailing SOEs.81 The reform adopted market 
mechanisms, which played an innovative role in aligning the interests of the 
government and public investors. The corporatization process mitigated the 
role played by the State by reducing its ownership, and opening up the se-
curities market to enable investors to share the risk and profit of enterprises 
that had hitherto been controlled by and been responsible to the State.  
Foreign Investment and Entering into the WTO 
According to figures from the United Nations Conference of Trade and 
Industry, foreign corporations invested $128.5bn, which made China the 
top destination for foreign direct investment in 2014.82 The dramatic in-
crease of foreign investment is regarded as an external push for the devel-
opment of corporate governance towards a position where there is less gov-
ernment interference and administration in the private sector, making it a 
better fit for the internationalised equity market. In this sense, Chinese cor-
porate governance may have benefited from the impact of foreign invest-
ment on governance and performance. Government regulators have allowed 
an increasing number of foreign investors to take up substantial sharehold-
ings, which is desirable because of the investors’ experience, sophistication, 
and the potentially positive influence that they may bring to Chinese corpo-
rate governance.83 China’s accession to the WTO is a key aspect of its inte-
gration into the world economy, and constitutes both an economic and a 
symbolic policy success.84 James Wolfensohn, former president of the 
World Bank group, suggested that China needed to improve its corporate 
                                                          
 81 David A. Caragliano, Administrative Governance as Corporate Governance: A Partial 
Explanation for the Growth of China’s Stock Markets, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1278, 1293 
(2009). 
 82 China Overtakes US for Foreign Direct Investment, BBC (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-31052566; China is also at the top of the 2014-2015 list 
of the corporations most attractive to multinational corporations. 
 83 Samuel A. Beatson, Jia Chen & Shujie Yao, Foreign Investment, Corporate Govern-
ance & Performance in the Chinese Listed A Share Companies, (School of Contemporary 
Chinese Studies and China Policy Institute Working Paper Series of 2014),  
www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/. . ./working-paper-18-samuel-a-beaston.pdf. 
 84 Razeen Sally & Rahul Sen, Whither Trade Policies in Southeast Asia? The Wider 
Asian and Global Context, 22 ASEAN ECON. BULL. 92 (2005).  After an arduous negotiation 
process lasting more than fifteen years, China became a member of the WTO, a body that 
probably constitutes the most remarkable achievement of economic globalization in recent 
years. 
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governance in order to attract more foreign investment, and survive interna-
tional competition following its WTO entry. He also suggested that China 
needed to address “special problems as a country with a huge number of 
State-owned enterprises.”85 Trade liberalization in the context of WTO en-
try created pressure to reallocate productive resources according to China’s 
comparative advantages, which was regarded as the exercise of external 
pressure on China to transition to a market economy. It suggests that corpo-
rate governance arrangements will decide the way that corporations and 
other economic agents responded to these pressures.86  The foreign invest-
ment and accession of China to the WTO can be regarded as constituting 
external pressure on the Chinese government to adopt international guide-
lines, and to make Chinese corporations more familiar with western corpo-
rate governance practices. 
Corporate Governance Guidelines and Internationally Recognized 
Guidelines 
Apart from the government legislation for corporation law, the CSRC 
played an active role in improving corporate governance. In January 2001, 
the CSRC issued its Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
(the Code) in China. The Code, like many other codes around the world, 
contains broad and vague language describing guiding principles, rather 
than providing explicit regulation. The Code converges considerably with 
international corporate governance guidelines, since the draft largely relied 
on the OECD’s Corporate Governance Principles,87 and almost all the pro-
visions contained in it have parallel provisions in the law of the United 
Kingdom and the United States or the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
Despite the fact that there are many doubts whether the OECD Principles 
are appropriate in an emerging economy like China,88 the Code proposes 
good corporate governance practices, including the requirement for active 
boards of directors, independent outside directors as a majority of the board, 
and protecting the interests of minority shareholders and stakeholders, 
                                                          
 85 WB President: Urgent to Improve Corporate Governance in Post-WTO China, 
PEOPLE’S DAILY (May 27, 2002), http://www.china.org.cn/english/33352.htm.  
 86 STOYAN TENEV & CHUNLIN ZHANG & LOUP BREFORD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
ENTERPRISE REFORM IN CHINA: BUILDING THE INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN MARKETS 2 (2002). 
WTO membership has been seen as the most important government push for SOE reform, 
characterized by the acceleration of decentralized corporatization and the emphasis of corpo-
rate governance primacy, with corresponding financial reforms in the banking and securities 
sectors. 
 87 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], OECD Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance (May 1999). While the guidelines have since been update in 
2015, this is the version that has been followed by the Code. See Victor Zitian Chen, Jing Li 
& Daniel M. Shapiro, Are OECD-prescribed “Good Corporate Governance Practices” Re-
ally Good in an Emerging Economy, 28 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 115 (2011).   
 88 See Chen, Li & Shapiro, supra note 87.  
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which all require strong free markets and economic governance with mini-
mum government interference.  
The International CSR standards have been regarded as examples of 
external pressure brought to bear for the development of corporate govern-
ance in China. The most popular standard for manufacturers in China is 
SA8000.89 However, adopting SA8000 is a controversial issue in China, be-
cause there are various opinions about the role of CSR standards in the 
global supply chain. That the Chinese authorities now recognize CSR as a 
way to improve the competitiveness of corporations suggests that the im-
pact of SA8000 on Chinese industry and export-oriented firms has been 
taken on board.90 The International Integrated Reporting Council introduced 
ISO 26000, the Guidance on Social Responsibility, in 2010 as a new ap-
proach to corporate reporting, and it has had a significant impact world-
wide. The Standardization Administration of the People’s Republic of Chi-
na published and translated a Chinese version of ISO 26000, under the 
authorization of the International Organization for Standardization, and 
provides “a solid start” as a new way of conducting business.91 These inter-
nationally recognized CSR standards make a self-regulatory framework in-
creasingly important for Chinese corporations, to promote their corporate 
image and sustainability. They also address social and environmental prob-
lems, which were regarded as government problems that may only be set-
tled through government policies and economic strategies in SOEs under 
administrative governance. 
Cross-listing of Chinese Corporations 
Figures from 201292 show that eighty-four Chinese listed companies 
cross-listed their stocks.93 Cross-listing securities is an efficient way to ac-
                                                          
 89 See SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACCREDITATION SERVICES, http://www.saasaccreditation. 
org. SA8000 is now internationally recognised and widely accepted as the most viable and 
comprehensive workplace management system for ethical issues. The system requires ongo-
ing compliance and continual improvement of ethical standards of corporations, with in-
volvement from stakeholders including participation by all key sectors in the SA8000 sys-
tem, including employees, trade unions, companies, socially responsible investors, 
nongovernmental organisations, the government and the public.  
 90 LIANGRONG ZU, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND 
FIRM’S PERFORMANCE 46 (2009). 
 91 Chen Wang, ISO 26000 in China: A New Way of Doing Business, ISO FOCUS+, May 
2012. 
 92 Fuxiu Jiang & Kenneth A. Kim, Corporate Governance in China: A Modern Perspec-
tive, 32 J. CORP. FIN. 190, 213 (2015). Eight-four Chinese listed corporations are cross-listed 
on another stock exchange, including eighty on the Hong Kong stock exchange, ten on both 
the Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges, one on the Singapore stock exchange and 
two on both the Hong Kong and London stock exchanges. One is on three exchanges, name-
ly the Hong Kong, New York and London stock exchanges.  
 93 Jiang & Kim, supra note 92, at 113. There are seventy firms listed on the Hong Kong 
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cess international financial markets, and it is a mechanism that is often re-
lated to improved corporate governance practices in a stronger investment 
environment, providing higher requirements for information disclosure and 
corporate governance rules.94 Cross-listing may also help corporations im-
prove their corporate governance by voluntarily embracing both stronger 
regulatory regimes and soft laws, which include regulations for stock ex-
changes and corporate governance codes required by the host exchange.95 
As to corporations in emerging markets, cross-listing through American 
Depository Receipts programs is associated with more crossborder flows, 
and greater integration in globalized capital markets.96 A good example of 
enhanced cross-listing is South Korea, where listed corporations are given 
the option to cross-list in nine foreign stock markets,97 as part of the coun-
try’s modernization and globalization, and embrace of convergent corporate 
governance practice. The percentage of firms cross-listed in the United 
States by Chinese corporations increased from 6% (ranked fifth), at the end 
of 2000, to 29% (ranked first), at the end of 2010.98  
Despite the fact that listing on the Hong Kong or Singapore stock ex-
changes may be more feasible and culturally friendly to Chinese corpora-
tions, these advantages have not dissuaded Chinese investors from listing in 
the US. China still has the highest percentage of cross-listing in the US. The 
high-volume cross-listing will inevitably transform the corporate govern-
ance model in China towards a more Anglo-American model. Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra have also argued that cross-listing in a US-based exchange 
is likely to implant a corporate governance code to enhance the efficiency 
of corporate governance in China.99  
Further, accounting and reporting practices of cross-listing Chinese 
corporations will therefore converge with those requirements extant in the 
US. These requirements are normally designed to avoid market abuse, and 
the enforcement of these regimens will reduce the involvement of adminis-
trative governance. It is argued that cross-listing can facilitate competition 
                                                                                                                                       
Stock Exchange, ten are listed on both the Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchanges, one 
corporation is listed on the Singapore Stock exchange, and two are listed on both the Hong 
Kong and London Stock Exchanges.  
 94 John C. Coffee Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
2151 (2001). 
 95 Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate Gov-
ernance Reform, 22 BERKELEY INT’L L. J. 195, 201-202 (2004). 
 96 G. Andrew Karolyi, The Role of American Depositary Receipts in the Development 
and Integration of Emerging Equity Markets, 86 THE REV. ECON. STAT. 670 (2003). 
 97 The cross-listing stock exchanges include NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX, and stock mar-
kets in London, Frankfurt, Paris, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 98 The data is adapted from Citibank Universal Issuance Guide (data refers to the 
NSDAQ and NYSE) (2011). 
 99 Ruth V. Aguilera & Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Codes of Good Governance Worldwide: 
What is the Trigger?, 25 ORG. STUD. 415 (2004).  
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among stock exchanges in terms of regulatory competition with resulting 
harmonisation and/or convergence.100 Listing corporations in jurisdictions 
with more developed legal systems and corporate governance models will 
subject corporations to a higher governance standard and a more sophisti-
cated market discipline. On a different note, cross-listing will change the 
shareholding structure in China and reduce the concentrated ownership of 
the State. This will also lead to the greater internationalisation of Chinese 
corporations.  
V. ADVANTAGES OF ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
The problems that administrative governance can cause are deeply 
rooted in the Chinese political system, culture, and shareholding ownership 
scheme. Government involvement and administrative governance will be 
elements of Chinese corporate governance as long as the Party is the sole 
political party in China and state ownership and control exists. The Party’s 
participation constitutes the primary way to secure political support to en-
sure that it remains in power. The market transition in China from a poor 
agrarian economy based in state socialism to a dynamic capitalist engine 
has riveted attention on the role played by government and administrative 
power in promoting transformative economic development.101 It is submit-
ted that both administrative and economic governance will co-exist in Chi-
na for a long time without the likely possibility of convergence to any ex-
treme models. Thus, it is worth discussing how advantage might be taken of 
administrative governance in order to enhance fairness, efficiency and ac-
countability in corporate governance, and to provide a more sound and sus-
tainable response to globalisation of the Chinese market and economy. 
These positive effects may also be relevant to other jurisdictions that have 
emerging and/or mature markets.  
A Critical but Accepting Attitudes towards Administrative Governance 
For the pure economic corporate purpose of maximizing firm value 
there should be no state control and ownership concentration in China. Ad-
ministrative governance can be explained by politically-oriented reasons, 
such as retaining the ability of the state to impose on corporations aims oth-
er than shareholder value maximization. These include retaining employees, 
enhancing societal harmony, ensuring employment across both urban and 
rural areas, maintaining control of certain industries, and the provision of 
                                                          
 100 Hwa-Jin Kim, Cross-Listing of Korean Companies on Foreign Exchanges: Law and 
Policy, 3 J. KOREAN L. 1, 13 (2003).  
 101 Victor Nee, Sonja Opper & Sonia Wong, Developmental State and Corporate Gov-
ernance in China, 3 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 19, 19 (2007).  
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social safety net services.102 Premier Li has argued that government is the 
organiser for reform, and also the promoter of, and the object for, economic 
reform. Therefore, consideration needs to be given to how to enhance the 
positive role played by administrative governance in this transition.103 
Looking to the future, the Economist predicted that China will emerge as 
the largest economy in the world by 2021.104 We maintain that healthy and 
sound corporate governance will play a vital role in China’s self-sustaining 
momentum, and administrative power and interference are unavoidable and 
critical.105  
In the liberal political economy proposed by Adam Smith in his semi-
nal work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Na-
tions,106 the government monitors and enforces the regulatory environment 
in which corporations compete for profit, but it should not directly be in-
volved in a corporation’s decisions and transactions. Since this was posited, 
many reasons have been advanced arguing that state control over commer-
cial transactions will lead to benefits for business organisations. It is argued 
that, based on the efficiency of the corporate form, direct involvement of 
state officials will impose on the corporations’ multiple political interests 
which will dilute marketing motives when social objectives collide with 
shareholders’ wealth maximisation. Information asymmetry and uncertainty 
will constrain the effectiveness of coordination and interference from gov-
ernment. The willingness of the government to share the risk might both 
weaken the motivation of corporations to make more profits and lead to soft 
budgetary constraints with a subsequent attenuation of a firm’s efficiency. 
However, the effectiveness and necessity of government interference in 
business organisations has been questioned and discussed in various dimen-
sions especially after the financial crisis of 2008. Instead of having a direct 
role in facilitating and shaping the dynamic growth played by the state, it is 
posited that the State’s ability in creating and maintaining a supportive cli-
mate of growth is key for an emerging market to achieve good levels of 
economic development and stability.107  However, it is important for admin-
                                                          
 102 See supra note 75, at 226. It is argued that the most important political reason for 
maintaining state ownership is to defend the ruling position of the Party under the current 
political regime in terms of economic ownership and control of resource allocation, which is 
regarded as an important basis for the authority and legitimacy of government. 
 103 Li Keqiang, Some Issues on Deepening Economic System Reform, SEEKING TRUTH 
(Sept. 2014), http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2014/201409/201404/t20140428_344319.htm. 
 104 Chinese and American GDP Forecasts: Catching the Eagle, ECONOMIST, Nov 21st 
2013, https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/08/chinese-and-american-gdp-
forecasts 
 105 The New Titians: A Survey of the World Economy, ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 2006, at 5. 
 106 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
(Edwin Cannan ed. 1777).  
 107 Guido Bertucci & Adriana Alberti, Globalization and the Role of the State: Challeng-
es and Perspectives, in REINVENTING GOVERNMENT FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: STATE 
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istrative involvement to be effective and only applicable when necessary. 
Positive attempts have been made to modernize the administrative govern-
ance system and reduce transaction costs, including abolition of both the 
minimum registered capital108 and the current paid-in capital registration 
system.109 These legislative reforms aim to abolish excessive administrative 
burdens, reduce both bureaucratic procedures and the cost of market entry 
in order to stimulate investment, and make administrative governance flexi-
ble to fit with inevitable developments. 
Long Term Strategic Planning and Multiple Goals of SOEs 
It is argued that, government intervention, often the most visible aspect 
of administrative governance, may inevitably change the corporate objec-
tive of SOEs in the direction that is preferred or designed by the govern-
ment.110 This distortion of the corporate objective may lead to investment 
inefficiency. SOEs may miss profitable investment opportunities due to the 
resources expended in executing the plans and policies of the government, 
and SOEs may find it difficult to terminate the unprofitable projects or re-
duce their investment in these projects due to potential conflicts with gov-
ernment agenda and policy.111 However, to see this as totally negative ig-
nores various support that could be offered to corporations subject to 
administrative governance. This support includes giving boards of directors 
the right to consider the long-term interests of corporations, and to make 
recommendations on the long-term strategic development plans and major 
investment decisions of the corporation as provided for in the corporate 
governance code. Within allowances made by government, administrative 
governance enables the corporation to employ corporate profit for further 
internal and external investment expansion and sustainable corporate strate-
gic development. It also lays the foundation for government supervision in 
order to mitigate the problems resulting from unstable financial markets in 
China. Furthermore, at the international level, SOEs are at the forefront of 
negotiations and business relationship with foreign governments, multina-
tional corporations and international institutional investors who are willing 
                                                                                                                                       
CAPACITY IN A GLOBALIZING SOCIETY 17-33 (Dennis A. Rondinelli et al. eds., 2003). 
 108 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 2005, arts. 26 & 81.Under the unre-
vised Law, the minimum registered capital was RMB5 million (about US$800,000) for a 
corporation limited by shares, and RMB30,000 (about US$5,000) for a corporation with lim-
ited liability.  
 109 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 2005, arts. 26, 30, 81 & 84 (requir-
ing companies to file details of both their registered capital and paid-in capital with the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce or its relevant branch. Furthermore, it removes 
the requirement for minimum cash contributions making up 30% of the registered capital 
based on Unrevised Company Law Arts 27). 
 110 Justin Y. Lin, ET AL., Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-owned Enterprise Re-
form, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1998). 
 111 Id. at 425-27. 
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to interact with the Chinese government and Chinese corporations. State 
presence in SOEs is significant for the long-term healthy growth of the 
global economy and the sustainability of business and civil society as a 
whole. 
An excessive concentration on short-term considerations is one reason 
often given for the rapid financial growth globally in the last decade and the 
ongoing worldwide crisis.112 A lack of long-term goals and investment in 
human and social capital has been regarded as a patent problem for Anglo-
American corporations, which has led to competitive disadvantages.113 
Short-term motivation has led to the pursuit of short-term reckless business 
strategies and insufficient risk management. The political economy litera-
ture has observed that government and administrative agencies are typically 
serving multiple goals which could, in the short run, impede corporations 
pursuing long-term interests.114 Administrative governance with govern-
ment interference may ease the pressure of corporations pursuing share-
holder value in the short-term and put the emphasis on the long-term value 
of corporations and national goals. Administrative governance could be 
used as an additional governance mechanism to mitigate conflicts such as 
those that exist in the case of corporations trading across community 
boundaries, secondary policies in public procurement, and redundancies and 
reemployment to secure broader social consensus. Thus, administrative 
governance could facilitate and shape dynamic economic growth by estab-
lishing supportive business environments and introducing legislation that 
enables rather than hinders investors to establish corporations as vehicles to 
do business.  
Following the financial crisis of 2008, both government policies and 
                                                          
 112 Sheila Bair, Lessons of the Financial Crisis: The Dangers of Short-Termism, Posted 
by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance & Financial Regulation, on 
Monday, July 4, 2011 available via https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/07/04/lessons-of-
the-financial-crisis-the-dangers-of-short-termism/; John C. Coffee, What Went Wrong? An 
Initial Inquiry into the Causes of the 2008 Financial Crisis, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 1(2009); 
William Lazonick, In the Name of Shareholder Value: How Executive Pay and Stock Buy-
backs are Damaging the US Economy, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, 476 (Thomas Clarke & Douglas Branson eds., 2012); Emilios Avgouleas, The 
Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural Finance and Financial Regulation: In Search of a New 
Orthodoxy,  9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 23 (2009); Shaun Frencha, ET AL., A Very Geographical 
Crisis: the Making and Breaking of the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis, 2 CAMBRIDGE J. 
REGIONS, ECON. & SOC’Y 287 (2009); Thomas Clarke, The Impact of Financialisation on 
International Corporate Governance: The Role of Agency Theory and Maximising Share-
holder Value, 8 L. & FIN. MARKETS REV. 39 (2014); Thomas Clarke, Dangerous Frontiers in 
Corporate Governance, 20 J. MGMT. & ORG. 26 (2014). 
 113 For instance, see Michael E. Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way American 
Invests in Industry, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEMS: A COMPARISON OF THE U.S., JAPAN, & EUROPE 5-8 (Donald H. Chew ed., 1997). 
 114 David E. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Privatization, Information, and Incentives, 
6 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 567 (1987). 
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academic literature have sought to develop a long-term approach in corpo-
rate life.115 This long term strategic planning is critical for China. The fact 
that it has a population of 1.378 billion116 means that there are many poten-
tial social and environmental problems such as the need for employment, 
fiscal health, regional development, and social stability.117 Positively, the 
World Bank reported that transformative economic growth in China result-
ed in 170 million people moving out of absolute poverty, thus accounting 
for more than a 75 percent poverty reduction in the developing world from 
1990 to 2000.118 At the national level, SOEs can be regarded as important 
vehicles that may have an impact on elements of entire markets and enable 
governments to intervene in resource allocation, prices in the economy, or 
settling social problems like unemployment in order to achieve long term 
government strategy.119  
Under the corporate governance regime with which governments could 
identify, the ability to monitor corporations and enforce their interests as 
owners, government officials could replace entrepreneurs as the actors driv-
ing the economic performance of corporations, especially SOEs.120 Despite 
the fact that economic literature suggests that direct involvement of state 
officials who impose on corporations multiple political interests may dilute 
profit-making as the primary goal of corporations and inhibit economic re-
forms in China, administrative involvement does have a function in long-
term strategic planning because it is free from the pressure of pursing im-
mediate returns for demanding shareholders. Chinese SOEs have social re-
sponsibility as an additional goal and they serve as key vehicles to enable 
                                                          
 115 G. Cox, Overcoming Short-termism within British Business: The Key to Sustained 
Economic Growth: An independent review by Sir George Cox commissioned by the Labour 
Party, p.4, available via Your Britain, the Labour party policy review website 
http://www.yourbritain.org.uk/uploads/. . ./Overcoming_Short-termism.pdf; Yan Liang, 
China’s Short-Term and Long-Term Development After the 2007 Global Financial Crisis: 
Some Critical Reflection, 45 THE CHINA ECON. 3 (2012); Marc, T. Moore & Edward Walker-
Arnott, A Fresh Look at Stock Market Short-termism, 41  J. L. & SOC’Y 416 (2014); Andrew 
Johnston & Paige Morrow, Towards Long-Termism in Corporate Governance: the Share-
holder Rights Directive and Beyond,  in LONG-TERM INVESTMENT AND THE SUSTAINABLE 
COMPANY: A STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVE VOL. III 19 (Sigurt Vitols ed.,  2015); Pierre Hab-
bard, Shifting to the Long-term: The Road Ahead,  in LONG-TERM INVESTMENT AND THE 
SUSTAINABLE COMPANY: A STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVE VOL. III 93 (Sigurt Vitols ed., 2015). 
 116 The World Bank Data of 2016; see https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP. 
TOTL. 
 117 Shimin Chen, ET AL., Government Intervention and Investment Efficiency: Evidence 
from China, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 259, 260 (2011).  
 118 World Bank, World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington D.C (2004). 
 119 Zhaofeng Wang, Corporate Governance under State Control: The Chinese Experi-
ence, 13 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 487, 491 (2012). 
 120 Victor Nee, Sonja Opper & Sonia Wong, Developmental State and Corporate Gov-
ernance in China, 3 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 19, 20 (2007). 
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the State to achieve economic stability, development and sustainability.121 
SOEs are used to serve political and social objectives which may have a 
negative impact on firms’ economic performance based on the “grabbing 
hand theory.”122 However, it is argued as “overly simplistic”123 that the 
“helping hand theory” may help government generate a positive effect on 
corporations’ performance in securing limited resources and using them in a 
more organised and strategic manner in a quasi-market economy to mitigate 
agency problems in a transformative corporate governance model.124 There-
fore, SOEs are able to achieve a combined objective of national goals and 
corporate performance setting a model for compliance with the law and un-
dertaking social responsibility.  
Government officials are regarded as market oriented agencies and 
could use superior information and monitoring capacity to achieve long-
term planning.125 Like most other countries, one of the main roles and mis-
sions of SOEs is to promote social welfare where corporations can curry fa-
vour with government by engaging in CSR activities.126 Advocates of free 
markets argue that governments should have minimum interference in the 
business operation because it could prompt decisions that threaten a corpo-
ration’s financial goal.127 However, arguably administrative power will pro-
vide more political power for corporations and the board of directors would 
be under less pressure from its shareholders to pursue short-term interests. 
It will be comparatively easier for it to take advantages of examples includ-
ing scientific technology to maintain a sustainable and effective business 
environment in order to achieve strategic goals in the longer term.128 China 
is undergoing a considerable corporate governance evolution but has yet to 
                                                          
 121 See supra note 118.  
 122 Yingyi Qian, Enterprise Reform in China: Agency Problems and Political Control, 4 
ECON. TRANSITION 427 (1996); see also Richard McGregor, The Little Red Book of Business 
in China, Financial Times, July 8, 2001. 
 123 JIANGYU WANG, COMPANY LAW IN CHINA: REGULATION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
IN A SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY 152 (2014). 
 124 Eric C. Chang & Sonia M.L. Wong, Political Control and Performance in China’s 
Listed Companies, 32 J. COMP. ECON. 617, 618 (2004). 
 125 With this function of the government, the long-term strategy also enables corpora-
tions, especially SOEs, to address economic, political, social and environmental goals of 
government. 
 126 Fuxiu Jiang & Kenneth A. Kim, Corporate Governance in China: A Modern Perspec-
tive, 32 J. CORP. FIN. 190, 195, 213 (2015). 
 127 Alvaro Cuervo & Belen Villalonga, Explaining the Variance in the Performance Ef-
fects of Privatization, 25 ACAD. MGMT. 581 (2000); see also JOHN ZYSMAN, GOVERNMENTS, 
MARKETS AND GROWTH: FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 
(1983).  
 128 Petronas, a SOE in Malaysia is a good example of success as industrial top quartile 
which began an operational excellence campaign focusing on technical capabilities and more 
effective working cultural. See the 2009 sustainability report of Petronas available via  
www.petronas.com.my/sustainability/. . ./sustainability%20report2009.pdf.   
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establish a unifying system that balances social-economic forces with the 
needs of the economy. 
Government action could impact both corporations in which the state 
has controlling shares and those in which the state only owns part of the 
shares. Musacchio argues that the government has improved corporate gov-
ernance practices of SOEs.129 In corporations that the government out-
sources management to the private sector due to reasons of privatisation and 
international investment, the State still has a veto power over key strategic 
decisions.130 A variety of state capitalism exists, including situations where 
the State acts as majority shareholder or minority shareholder, and in each 
type of case  the State  is able to offer strategic support through policies 
stimulating corporations’ capabilities and long-term planning to achieve 
sustainable corporate goals. As the result of the administrative reforms car-
ried out in the 1980s, government regulations, policies, and procedural 
guidelines have become increasingly more precise and transparent. This has 
had a positive impact on the predictability of bureaucratic decisions reduc-
ing the uncertainty of government economic policies and strategic planning 
thus encouraging more active international investment for long-term, sus-
tainable, and quality growth in China.131  
Effectiveness of Government Interference   
The policies, rules, and legislation introduced to further transformation 
can be categorised in two ways: globalization and devolution. The govern-
ment plays a key role in both.132 The transformation of corporate govern-
ance can also be regarded as the process by which we see the globalisation 
of the Chinese corporate governance model and the devolution of central 
government power in order to give corporations and boards of directors 
                                                          
 129 Aldo Musacchio, ET AL., New Varieties of State Capitalism: Strategic and Govern-
ance Implications, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 115, 115 (2015). Taking Sinopec (China’s national 
oil corporations) as an example, so far as aspects of listing corporations on stock exchanges, 
recruiting independent board members and enhancing financial reporting and these reforms 
have reduced agency conflicts and attracted minority private investors. 
 130 See supra note 128 at 116; for a case study of Leviathan see Carlos F. K. V. Inoue, 
Sergio G, Lazzarini, & Aldo Musacchio, Leviathan as a Minority Shareholder: Firm-level 
Performance Implications of Equity Purchases by the Government, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1775 
(2013). 
 131 Victor Nee, Sonja Opper, & Sonia Wong, Developmental State and Corporate Gov-
ernance in China, 3 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 19, 24 (2007); see also Derek Headey, Ravi 
Kanbur & Xiaobo Zhang, China’s Growth Strategies, GOVERNING GROWTH IN CHINA: 
EQUITY AND INSTITUTIONS 1 (Ravi Kanbur & Xiaobo Zhang eds., 2008); for the discussion 
on government policy and Chinese stock market see YANRUI WU, SAM HAK KAN TANG, 
XIANG MEI FAN & NICOLAAS GROENEWOLD, THE CHINESE STOCK MARKET: EFFICIENCY, 
PREDICTABILITY AND PROFITABILITY (2004).  
 132 Donald F. Kettl, The Transformation of Governance: Globalization, Devolution and 
the Role of Government, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 488 (2000).  
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more autonomy to control corporations. This includes SOEs. These trans-
formations will also lead to economic globalisation, deepen China’s market 
economy and intensify market competition. Therefore, the government will 
act as the main facilitator of economic development and adjust the market 
to direct the route of transformation.133  The government plays a triple role 
in the enforcement of the law, namely as a regulator in overseeing markets 
and corporations, as a supervisor and promoter of corporations, as well as 
having a role in the adaption and utilization of international rules on corpo-
rate governance.134 The government could use mandatory administration 
and legal means to remedy market failures to promote economic growth and 
industrialization. In a country that lacks an independent and effective judi-
cial system and a sufficient number of qualified legal professionals,135 the 
administrative power that is derived from government interference is func-
tional in responding to the inadequacies of efficient markets, and the exist-
ence of a unique market economy with Chinese characteristics.136 Adminis-
trative governance is introduced with multiple aims including investor 
protection, information disclosure, and addressing systemic risks in order to 
maintain fair, efficient and transparent markets.   
As for the market regulator, CSRC, it is a ministerial-level public insti-
tution directly under the auspices of the State Council and performs a uni-
fied regulatory function.137 Thus, it needs to be emphasized that the CSRC 
is not independent. A good example of the government role in having a 
quick and swift market interference is CSRC’s policy to bail out the stock 
market in July 2015. In order to slow down the stock market plunge, CSRC 
took the drastic step of banning, for six months, shareholders holding more 
than 5% of a corporation’s capital from selling shares in an effort to halt a 
plunge in stock prices.138 This was done in order to maintain the stability of 
the capital market and effectively protect investors’ lawful rights and inter-
ests in responding to an irrational slump that the Chinese securities market 
had experienced. 139 The CSRC used the halt in trading and other measures 
                                                          
 133 Meixia Chen, Transformation of Chinese Government’s Economic Function under 
Globalization, Proceeding for International Conference on Public Management: International 
Integration for Regional Public Management: New Challenges and Opportunities (2014). 
 134 For example, adapting and adopting the new G20/OECD corporate governance princi-
ple. 
 135 See Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, and Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth 
in China, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 57(2005). 
 136 It might be argued that the role of the State in this way means that judicial effective-
ness may never develop. 
 137 CSRC, Introducing the CSRC, available via http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/ 
about/.   
 138 China Bans Major Shareholders from Selling Their Stakes for Next Six Months, The 
Guardian, (Jul. 8, 20150), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/09/china-bans-major-
shareholders-from-selling-their-stakes-for-next-six-months. 
 139 China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, Announcement No. 18 [2015]. (Aug. 7 2015), 
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to control downward pressure amid volatility.140 Another mechanism im-
plemented by the CSRC was the “circuit breaker” mechanism.141 This 
mechanism was introduced to give markets a cooling-off period to provide 
the markets and investors time to digest the market information and to en-
hance the stability of the Chinese stock market, but was suspended after 
seven days.142 This demonstrates that the government is capable of making 
instant responses to the market with immediate effect through administrate 
governance. Despite the fact that these administrative interferences may 
have a negative impact on the predictability of rules and legislation, the ef-
ficient response from the government is effective and inevitable for the 
Chinese stock market. In the transformative journey of corporate govern-
ance, the government’s responses to problems such as immature market 
failure, temporary market conditions, and the abolition of ineffective legis-
lative approaches are crucial for China, a country with a massive number of 
individual market participants.143  
VI. CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPACT OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE IN THE 
TRANSFORMATION PROCESS  
In this section, the characteristics and impact of administrative corpo-
rate governance will be examined to illuminate the uniqueness of corporate 
governance in China. The nature of administrative governance and govern-
ment interference in corporations will be discussed as important elements in 
                                                                                                                                       
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:lEwAAKLwLkgJ:www.lawinfochi
na.com/display.aspx%3Fid%3D19456%26lib%3Dlaw+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (The 
prohibition applied to foreign investors who held stakes in Shanghai- or Shenzhen-listed 
corporations, although most of their holdings are below 5%). 
 140 However, some observers felt the system as designed could have increased investor 
concerns about the health of the market. 
 141 Circuit breaker mechanism is the measure approved by the SEC originally in 1987 in 
order to curb panic-selling on U.S. stock exchanges and excessive volatility. This was intro-
duced on New Year’s Day 2016, to prevent sharp falls and contain wild swings in the mar-
kets in late 2015. The mechanism is closely attached to CSI300 Index (the Index tracks the 
largest listed corporations in Shanghai and Shenzhen). According to the circuit breaker 
mechanism, a move of five percent, either up or down, from the index’s previous close will 
led to a half-an-hour trade suspension across equity indexes of China if the move occurs be-
fore 2:30 pm local time. After that, a five percent move will freeze trading until the market 
close at 3.00 pm. 
 142 See K. Allen & G. Wearden, China Suspends Circuit Breaker Aimed at Ending Stock 
Market Turmoil, The Guardian (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/ 
jan/07/china-suspends-mechanism-ending-stock-market-turmoil. (The CSRC said that “the 
circuit breaker mechanism was not the main reason for the market slump. It just didn’t work 
as anticipated. The negative effect of the mechanism outweighed its positive effect”). 
 143 There were 91 million participants (gu min) at July 2015 with an incredible 80% of 
urban Chinese households that are/were investors in the equity market: see the report of 
CSDC. See generally, http://www.chinaclear.cn/english/en_index.shtml. 
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the transformation process.  
Administrative Power and Corporate Governance in China 
The long-term coexistence of administrative and economic corporate 
governance is an aspect that is unique to China. The impact from adminis-
trative power on corporate governance in China lies in the “administrativi-
zation” of resource allocation, corporate objectives, the appointment and 
removal of senior executives, and imposition of administrative liability for 
the breaching of directors’ duties.144  The political involvement in corporate 
governance is seen as one of the primary manifestations of administrative 
corporate governance.145 China launched a major economic reform and lib-
eralization strategy in the 1980s. This involved the introduction of two im-
portant strategies during this period, namely the separation of state owner-
ship and control and the separation of enterprise from government 
administration.146 Instead of having no independent decision-making pow-
ers, the corporation’s role changed fundamentally.147 The Chinese stock 
market was originally organized by the government as a vehicle for SOEs 
to raise capital and improve operating performance.148 The Chinese gov-
ernment also tried to develop a unique corporate governance system that 
possessed specific characteristics including clearly defined property rights, 
designated authorities and responsibilities, separate functions between gov-
ernment and enterprise, and scientific management.149 Notwithstanding the 
                                                          
 144 Administrative penalties as the result of breach of the duties include warnings, fines, 
confiscation of illegal income or property, and administrative detention. See China Sec. Reg. 
Comm’n, 2014 Annual Report (2015); China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, 2013 Annual Report 
(2014); China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, 2013 Annual Report (2014) (Amongst all cases concluded 
by CSRC, administrative sanctions were imposed upon 158, 79, and 56 cases in 2014, 2013, 
and 2012 consecutively). 
 145 Weian Li, Aichao Qiu & Zhihui Gu, Dual Corporate Governance Environment, Polit-
ical Connections Preference and Firm Performance—Study on Governance Transition of 
China’s Private Listed Firms (Shuangcong gongsi zhili huanjing: zhengzhi lianxi pianhao yu 
gongsi jixiao jiyu zhongguo minying shangshi gongsi zhili zhuanxing de yanjiu 
双重公司治理环境_政治联系偏好与公司绩效_基于中国民营上市公司治理转型的研究)
, 6 CHINA IND. ECON. 85, 94 (2010). 
 146 The decision of the Central Committee on Economic Structure Reform was announced 
in 1983, indicating the start of enterprise reform in order to improve inefficient SOEs. The 
committee was trying to transform the corporations into legal entities with the goal of mak-
ing profits, but also making them responsible for their losses. 
  147On Kit Tam, Capital Market Development in China, 19 WORLD DEV. 511 (1991). 
(The policy of autonomy allowed corporations to retain a certain portion of their profits for 
future strategic development). 
 148 STEPHEN GREEN, CHINA’S STOCK MARKET: A GUIDE TO ITS PROGRESS, PLAYERS AND 
PROSPECTS: THE PLAYERS, THE INSTITUTIONS AND THE FUTURE (2003). 
 149 This is due to the reason that the Chinese government allowed productive enterprises 
to become separate legal persons in 1987. See Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Minfa Tong-
ze (中华人民共和国民法通则) [The General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s 
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fact that the first Chinese company law enshrined many classic features of 
corporate governance that were consistent with the Anglo-American mod-
el,150 regulations were drafted in such a way as to favour SOEs or corpora-
tions with close ties to the government.151 Therefore, it is clear that consid-
eration of both the transition in corporate governance and the dynamic role 
played by administrative power can contribute significantly to determine 
how the corporate governance model in China is going to be shaped and 
structured in the future. The developments in corporate governance that 
were initiated in the early days were labelled as producing “modern” corpo-
rations, and reflected the intention behind the transition to a market-oriented 
economy, but with Chinese characteristics. Deng Xiaoping clarified that 
“planned” and “market” were merely economic means to achieve ends, and 
socialism can have a market too. Leaving aside arguments over whether the 
theory of the socialist market comes from orthodox Marxist economic theo-
ry, it seems that for the foreseeable future, the ownership structure will not 
be substantially changed so that the country can “keep to the socialist 
road.”152  
Along with the development of a socialist country, a market economy 
and a market-oriented corporate governance system have been introduced 
with unique Chinese characteristics.153 However, the unbalanced progress in 
the development of complementary, social, political, legal and economic 
infrastructure, as well as the high percentage of control and ownership of 
the shares by the State, makes it impossible for corporate governance to de-
velop a model based solely on successful Western experiences, and it is 
probably unreasonable and unnecessary for China to develop its corporate 
                                                                                                                                       
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 
1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 41, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=3990&context=lcp; see also On Kit Tam, Ethical Issues in Evolu-
tion of Corporate Governance in China, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 303, 307(2002). 
 150 See Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Minfa Tongze (中华人民共和国民法通则) [The 
General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 1, 5, 6, 14, 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3990&context=lcp; see also ON 
KIT TAM, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA ch. 6-7 (1999). 
 151Qiao Liu & Zhou Lu, Corporate Governance and Earrings Management in the Chi-
nese Listed Companies: A Tunnelling Perspective, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 881, 884 (2007).  
 152 Ligang Song, Emerging Private Enterprise in China: Transition Path and Implica-
tions, in CHINA’S THIRD ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATE ECONOMY 
29, 44-45 (Ross Garnaut & Ligang. Song eds., 2005); see also Derek Morris, The Reform of 
State-Owned Enterprises in China: The Art of the Possible, 11 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y. 
54 (1995); Dongwei Su & Xingxing He, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and 
Productive Efficiency in China, 38 J. PROD. ANALYSIS 303 (2012).  
 153 See Yingyi Qian and Barry Weingast, China’s Transition to Markets: Market-
preserving Federalism, Chinese Style, J. POL. REFORM 149 (1996); Junjie Hong, Chengqi 
Wang & Mario Kafouros, The Role of the State in Explaining the Internationalization of 
Emerging Market Enterprise, 26 BRITISH J. MGMT. 45 (2015).  
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governance in what would be, for China, an extreme direction. SOEs have 
undoubtedly become the dominant force in implementing this strategy, as 
evidenced by their control of over $690 billion in assets abroad. Forty-
seven centrally-owned Chinese firms ranked in last year’s Fortune Global 
500154 and there were three Chinese centrally-owned banks holding the top 
three spots in the 2016 Forbes Global 2000.155 The role of government as 
shareholders, the administrative governance on SOEs, and political and so-
cial mission of SOEs make administrative corporate governance indispen-
sable and SOEs, as the “the eldest son of the Party-State”, still denote their 
long-lasting and unbreakable ties with the Party-State administrative power. 
 
Government Interference and Influence in China  
Government decisions now only have a partial impact on the internal 
governance of Chinese-listed corporations, even those that the government 
controls.156 This implies “dynamic interplay” between external and internal 
government mechanisms.157 The transition that has taken place thus far has 
led to a corporate governance model characterised by gradualism, dualism, 
systematisation, and path dependency.158 The new corporate governance 
model has resulted from a systematic reform brought about by develop-
ments in legislation and legal enforcement, as well as changes in the nature 
of the shareholding structure, but all of these are subject to the influence of 
other factors such as Chinese traditions, history, values, and culture. The 
state’s large shareholdings and its resultant control of corporations is a solid 
reason for government involvement in the corporate governance. This indi-
cates that government policy placed increasing importance on establishing a 
market economy and it shifted towards a rule-based framework, but it is al-
ways in the shadow of the still dominant SOE sectors.159 
                                                          
 154 Wendy Leutert & Brookings Institution, China’s State Enterprise Reform: Bigger, 
Yes, but Better? FIN. TIMES, (Apr. 23, 2015), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/04/23/ 
chinas-state-enterprise-reform-bigger-yes-but-better/. 
 155 Steve Schaefer, The World’s Largest Companies 2016, Forbes, (May 25, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2016/05/25/the-worlds-largest-companies-
2016/#5bb5af6145a6. 
 156 Weian Li & Daying Yan, Transition from Administrative to Economic Model of Cor-
porate Governance: A New Analytical Framework for Research on China’s Corporate Gov-
ernance, 4 NANKAI BUS. REV. INT’L 4, 6 (2013). 
 157 Weian Li, Corporate Governance Code in China and its Interpretation Draft 
(Zhongguo Gongsi Zhiliyuance (Caoan) Jiqi Jieshuo), 1 NANKAI BUS. REV. (NANKAI GUANLI 
PINGLU) 9, 10-11 (2001). 
 158 Weian Li & Daying Yan, Transition from Administrative to Economic Model of Cor-
porate Governance: A New Analytical Framework for Research on China’s Corporate Gov-
ernance, 4 NANKAI BUS. REV. INT’L 4, 5-7 (2013). 
 159MICHAEL J. WHINCOP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 52 
(2005). 
01. KEAY&ZHAO - CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINESE CORPORATIONS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2018  11:51 AM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 38:187 (2018) 
222 
The hybrid and transformative model discussed in this article makes 
the role of the CSRC unpredictable and unsystematic. CSRC is directly un-
der the State Council, and is designed to perform a regulatory function in 
order to maintain legitimate and orderly securities and capital markets. For 
example, from the early 1990s when the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Ex-
changes were launched, the CSRC has been responsible for approving IP-
Os, and the government tightly controlled the IPO process.160 This situation 
changed during the late 1990s as the investment banks gradually took a 
greater role in the IPO process and assumed heavier responsibilities for 
identifying and developing candidates for listing.161 The current official role 
of the CSRC in the IPO process is to ensure that issuers comply with the 
rules. However, while the foregoing seems to suggest a major move to-
wards economic governance, the reality is that the CSRC still controls the 
IPO process tightly, for the CSRC has the power of financial approval re-
garding which firms can go public.162 The CSRC plays a key role in admin-
istrative governance by exercising a supervisory role over the domestic se-
curities regulatory institutions, which consequently enables it to control the 
securities markets. Stock markets in China have grown very rapidly since 
they were established in the early 1990s and have done so with weak or 
modest legal and corporate governance structures.163 The weak legal system 
and immature corporate governance system make the government role dis-
tinct, necessary and direct.  
The reforms that have been introduced came as a result of the fact that 
administrative corporate governance was heavily criticised due to its lack of 
efficiency and fairness. The main response to these criticisms has been a fo-
cus on the corporatisation of SOEs, as discussed in the reasons for trans-
formation, with thousands of poorly performing national and regional SOEs 
being either privatized or liquidated.164  Since 1980, the SOEs have gradual-
                                                          
 160 Yan-Leung Cheung, Zhiwei Ouyang & Weiqiang Tan, How Regulatory Changes Af-
fect IPO Underpricing in China, 20 CHINA ECON. REV. 692, 693 (2009); Joseph Aharony, 
Jiwei Wang & Hongqi Yuan, Tunnelling as an Incentive for Earnings Management during 
the IPO process in China, 29 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2010); Joseph D. Piotroski & Tianyu 
Zhang, Politicians and the IPO Decision: The Impact of Impending Political Portions on 
IPO Activity in China, 111 J. FIN. ECON. 111 (2014). 
 161 See also Enda Curran, Chinese Investment Banks on the Rise: China Renaissance Se-
curities Is the Top Adviser on Chinese IPOs in New York This Year, THE WALL ST. J. Jun. 
20, 2014; Bill B. Francis, Iftekhar Hasan & Xian Sun, Political Connections and the Process 
of Going Public: Evidence from China, 28 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 696 (2009). 
 162 Fuxiu Jiang & Kenneth A. Kim, Corporate Governance in China: A Modern Perspec-
tive, 32 J. CORP. FIN. 190, 191 (2014). 
 163 Gongmeng Chen, Michael Firth, Daniel N. Gao, & Oliver M. Rui, Is China’s Securi-
ties Regulatory Agency a Toothless Tiger? Evidence from Enforcement Actions, 24 J. ACCT. 
& PUB. POL’Y 451, 479–480 (2005). 
 164 See Gabriel Wildau, China Kicks off Second Round of Privatisation SOE Reform, FIN. 
TIMES. (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ec28674c-13ac-11e4-84b7-00144feabd 
c0.html#axzz3DOzmmx3b. 
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ly lost some of their primacy and advantage with the introduction of the 
Chinese government’s policy on the separation of government functions 
and business operations. The transformation from the policy opening up to 
unprecedented opportunity for market actors to influence policy decision-
making under Jiang’s leadership, which ended in 2002, enabled two im-
portant changes to occur, namely a slow withdrawal from economic reform 
primarily dependent on SOEs’ reconstruction and a transformation of state 
role from an active agent in the economy to a regulator.165 Under Hu’s lead-
ership (2002-2012), the process of corporatization slowed down in order to 
deal with social problems, such as unemployment, in keeping with the Chi-
nese value of establishing a harmonious society. Since 2013, under Xi’s 
leadership, “China dream” became the prevailing domestic theme. This 
theme encapsulated a vision for a successful, modern China. One of the 
significant factors underpinning the campaign that was related to the theme 
was growing self-confidence within the governing regime over economic 
achievements during the past decade.166  The growing assurance has been 
reflected in Chinese foreign policy and the rhetoric in relation to the policy 
while Xi has been credited with launching a series of new polices including 
the most eye-catching one: the “one belt, one road” initiative (OBOR). The 
initiative commenced in autumn 2013 when Xi visited Russia and Kazakh-
stan, where he announced the transport project plan with the view to estab-
lishing an “economic belt.” The belt is designed to link China with Mongo-
lia, Russia, Iran, Turkey, central Asia, “central and Eastern Europe, and 
ultimately Germany and the Netherlands” with the potential involvement of 
60 countries and 4 billion people by way of transport initiatives.167 Marked 
by the robust initiation of this OBOR initiative, the internationalization of 
SOEs has entered into a “new era”. Intercontinental trade and infrastructure 
initiative, along with the recent issuing of Guidance on Deepening SOE Re-
forms signals the finalisation of the SOE reform plan at the central leader-
ship level. Central government-owned enterprises have since been under-
taking major projects in implementing the OBOR initiative, “such as the 
Khorgos ‘dry port’ on the Kazakh-Chinese border and a railway link con-
necting Kazakhstan with Iran,”168 which have profound implications for re-
                                                          
 165 Jessica C. Teets, Stanley Rosen & Peter Hays Gries, Introduction: Political Change, 
Contestation and Pluralization in China Today, CHINESE POLITICS: STATE, SOCIETY AND THE 
MARKET 1, 15 (Peter H. Gries & Stanley Rosen eds., 2010). 
 166 See William A. Callahan, History, Tradition and the China Dream: Socialist Modern-
ization in the World of Great Harmony, 24 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 983 (2015). 
 167 Peter Ferdinand, Westward ho—the China Dream and ‘One Belt, One Road’: Chinese 
Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping, 92 INT’L AFF. 941, 950 (2016). 
 168 The OBOR Initiative focuses on connectivity and cooperation among countries be-
tween China and the rest of Eurasia, consisting of both the land-based “Silk Road Economic 
Belt” and the ocean-based “Maritime Silk Road.” It is estimated to cover “65 percent of the 
world’s population, about one-third of the world’s GDP, and about a quarter of all the goods 
and services the world moves.” China’s One Belt, One Road: Will It Reshape Global 
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gional collaboration, as well as provision for economic impact. SOEs in-
vesting abroad financed by the Chinese-controlled Asia Infrastructure In-
vestment Bank seems to be one of the chief instruments used by China to 
realize its geopolitical goals and its more muscular foreign policies, at least 
in the near future. The conduct of Chinese SOEs and other companies in-
vesting in the OBOR project is more likely to be subject to stricter scrutiny 
and incorporate international standards. Regulations and guidelines have 
been, and will continue to be, introduced in China in response to the OBOR 
initiative in order to manage the conduct of corporations involved in inter-
national investments. With the OBOR initiatives, a new development strat-
egy will enable China to “broaden its role in global markets and production 
networks as well as its potential geopolitical influence.”169 External pres-
sures, internationalized practice, and the introduction of a regulatory 
framework have precipitated the transformation of corporate governance 
from a purely administrative model to a hybrid one in order to promote 
transparency and effectiveness in corporate governance, the sustainable de-
velopment of China’s economy, and the Government’s expanding plan 
through the mechanism of OBOR. This hybrid model will be retained if 
there is no substantial change of the political system and while the state 
owns and controls corporations engaged in the country’s main industries.  
This administrative corporate governance has less impact on non-SOE 
corporations because their shareholders and directors do not have such a 
strong relationship with the government, and while the government can 
provide for mechanisms that permit it to interfere, it does not do so as fre-
quently as with SOEs. Therefore, the upshot is that despite the fact that 
these corporations are subject to administrative regulations from the central 
government, provincial governments and stock exchanges, they are com-
paratively more independent and are able to take greater advantages of 
market forces. These corporations are open to private investment and are 
more flexible and willing to adopt westernized corporate governance and 
investment philosophy.  These corporations have employment relationships 
and supply chains that rely heavily on market power rather than central ad-
ministrative allocations and appointments.  
It is worth mentioning that government interference is not just a poten-
tial problem in China, but is also the case in many other jurisdictions with 
emerging markets.170 It is characterised by a high level “of state ownership 
                                                                                                                                       
Trade?, MCKINSEY & COMPANY, (July 2016), (http://www.mckinsey. 
com/global-themes/china/chinas-one-belt-one-road-will-it-reshape-global-trade); see Jack 
Farchy, James Kynge, Chris Campbell & David Blood, One Belt, One Road, Financial 
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 169 Mimi Zou, China Must Set Ethical Standards for its Belt and Road Investments, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING (May 16, 2016) http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-
opinion/article/1945649/china-must-set-ethical-standards-its-belt-and-road. 
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and weak market”-oriented apparatus, and governments therefore often act 
as functional substitute for control failure.171 
Are Administrative Factors Hindering the Development of Efficient Chinese 
Corporate Governance? 
It may be argued that the involvement of administrative factors could 
have a negative impact on sound corporate governance that fits into a com-
petitive and globalized Chinese economy. The corporate governance model 
in China builds on a strong, authoritarian national leadership and an elite 
state bureaucracy pursuing development-oriented policies, including the di-
rect means of governing the market.172 The economic success in the last two 
decades is the result of combative policies, sometimes ones that are incon-
sistent with government control, interference, and administrative involve-
ment. These include liberalisation of the product and labor markets, entry 
into the WTO, and corporatization. These factors are seemingly in opposi-
tion to the administrative approach and may, in the following ways, hinder 
the development of corporate governance and be regarded as barriers to the 
further improvement of corporate governance in China.  
First, corruption as the result of administrative interference could be a 
primary concern that China faces in promoting more efficient corporate 
governance.173 Despite the fact that China’s anti-corruption campaign has 
led to the fall of hundreds of government officials, including board mem-
bers of SOEs, one of the most frequent problems emanating from adminis-
trative involvement in corporate governance is the possibility of excessive 
corruption as the result of abuse of power perpetrated by directors, and 
something known as state executive corruptions (gaoguan fubai 
                                                                                                                                       
ing Markets through Corporate Law, 15 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 447, 457-463 
(2016); see also Stijn Claessens & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, Corporate Governance in Emerging 
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view and an Agenda for Future Research, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 207 (2011); Michael N. Young, 
Mike W. Peng, David Ahlstrom, Garry D. Bruton & Yi Jiang, Corporate Governance in 
Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal-Principal Perspective, 45 J. MGMT. STUD. 
196 (2008).  
 171 Junjie Hong, Chengqi Wang & Mario Kafouros, The Role of the State in Explaining 
the Internationalization of Emerging Market Enterprises, 26 BRITISH J. MGMT. 45, 45 
(2015). 
 172 ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF 
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 173 See Qigui Liu, Tianpei Luo & Gary Tian, Political Connections with Corrupt Gov-
ernment Bureaucrats and Corporate M&A Decisions: A Natural Experiment from the Anti-
Corruption Cases in China, 37 PAC.-BASIN FIN. J. 52 (2016); see also Xun Wu, Corporate 
Governance and Corruption: A Cross Country Analysis, 18 GOVERNANCE 151 (2005); 
Chunxin Jia, Shujun Ding, Yuanshun Li & Zhenyu Wu, Fraud, Enforcement Action, and the 
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01. KEAY&ZHAO - CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINESE CORPORATIONS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2018  11:51 AM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 38:187 (2018) 
226 
高管腐败).174 It constitutes 60% of the cases involving the acceptance of 
bribes, according to the China Entrepreneur Report on Crime.175 Adminis-
trative governance increases the opportunity for corruption in the manage-
ment team and it derives from shareholding ownership and involvement of 
the State and the Party in SOEs.  According to the Chinese Company Law, 
decisions on matters concerning electing and replacing directors and super-
visors and the remuneration of directors and supervisors are entirely deter-
mined by the shareholders’ general meeting.176 Therefore, the fact that the 
State is the controlling shareholder places it in the absolute dominant posi-
tion in many SOEs. Apart from the influence of the State via shareholders’ 
meetings, the influence could also come from the Party. It is stated in the 
Company Law 2005 that “an organization of the CCP [the Party] shall be 
established to carry out the activities of the CCP in accordance with the 
charter of the CCP and the corporation shall provide the necessary condi-
tions for the activities of the party organization.”177  
Another awkward feature in Chinese SOEs is administrative rankings 
that are given to the chairmen and the senior executives by the government 
as they are an important factor and reflect the political connections that 
these senior officials have with political power.178 These senior officers can 
be exchanged directly with officials in provisional or central government.179 
The administrative ranking is closely related to the culture of guanxi (rela-
tionship), mianzi (giving face), promotion and demotion with strong possi-
bilities of misuse of these rankings to foster corrupt purposes.180  
                                                          
 174 Xin Lu, Ting Wu & Dan Long, Executives of State-owned Enterprises Corruption, 
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Jamil Anderlini, China Corruption Purge Snares 115 SOE ‘Tigers’: A Fifth of Those ‘Top-
pled from Their Horses’ Come from the Energy, F.T. May 18, 2015. available via 
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 176 [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) art. 38(2). 
 177 Article 37(2) Chinese Company Law 2005. 
 178 For details of administrative levels in China, see Article 16 of Civil Servant Law of 
the People’s Republic of China 2005. 
 179 Jing Liu, Political Connection of State-Owned Enterprises: An Analysis Based on the 
Listed Companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets, THE 19TH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT 1009, 1012-
2013 (Ershi Qi, Jiang Shen & Runliang Dou eds., 2013).  
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Secondly, administrative power may hinder the efficiency of corporate 
governance. One of the main issues that exists in Chinese corporate govern-
ance is the conflicting roles of the government between the establishment of 
a functional corporate governance environment in connection with the mar-
ket economy and the incomparable arbitrary and politically motivated gov-
ernment control. The administrative power somehow hinders the efficiency 
of corporate governance in terms of time-scale and the strategic direction of 
the decision-making process. There are many uncertainties that lie in rela-
tion to the implementation of governance. Two of these are the fact that ju-
dicial decisions are ignored by agencies and corporate decisions that in-
volve interference by government through the vast administrative 
bureaucracy within the hierarchy.181 In addition to the national representa-
tive bodies, including the executive, judicial, and administrative functions 
of the government, state-owned property and governance of this property is 
still closely regulated and supervised by the Chinese government, which in-
volves a range of issues including accounting, investment, deposition, debt 
repayment, transfer, and auditing of state-owned properties.182 
Furthermore, the administrative involvement through various channels 
at different levels may also make the corporate governance rules uncertain 
and unpredictable. The administrative power related to the drafting and im-
plementing of corporate governance-related rules at different levels, includ-
ing those devised by the state, government agencies such as the State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council, stock exchanges, and the provincial and city level may cause for-
eign investors to feel that the legislative framework is unstable and unpre-
dictable. This may hinder further investments and could impede the devel-
opment of corporate governance. The administrative power may also deter 
foreign investors because of the layers of a bureaucracy, which may be un-
predictable at times. These factors add additional transaction costs and 
make doing business unnecessarily complicated.  
No Universal Path for Transition 
It is suggested, based on the dynamic theory of corporate govern-
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Tanja Gasser & Juergen Noll, Corporate Governance in China–Is Economic Growth Poten-
tial Hindered by Guanxi?, 110 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 389 (2005); Andrew Keay & Jingchen 
Zhao, Accountability in Corporate Governance in China and the Impact of Guanxi as a 
Double-Edge Sword 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 377 (2017).  
 181 Pitman B. Potter, The Future of China’s Legal Regime, CHARTING CHINA’S FUTURE: 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES 67, 69 (David Shambaugh ed., 2011). 
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ance,183 that there is no universal path for the development of corporate 
governance,184 and this is true for Chinese corporate governance develop-
ment and transformation. Chinese corporate governance has advanced due 
to many factors that are related to government policies, culture, the legal 
system, board structure, the country’s economic development, and the 
structure of the shareholding of its corporations. Unlike classic corporate 
governance models, the governance model adopted by Chinese listed firms 
can best be described as a control-based system, in which the controlling 
shareholders, predominantly the State or State officials, “tightly control the 
listed firms through concentrated ownership and management-friendly 
boards.”185 This hybrid model can be explained based on a political model 
of corporate governance provided by Mark Roe, who argued that path de-
pendence can largely explain particular corporate governance models in dif-
ferent jurisdictions.186 Any transition in style of corporate governance can 
only be achieved during a long process, and during this time both adminis-
trative and economic elements of corporate governance will co-exist in a 
Chinese model. This transformation is a systematic one and the corporate 
governance model in China is certainly undergoing continuous change. This 
is particularly the case in a country with an emerging and transitional capi-
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tal market and where there are imperfect market regulatory mechanisms, 
immature investors, and a unique shareholding structure.187   
The existence of some elements of administrative corporate govern-
ance in China’s present corporate governance model is seen as the result of 
continued government control over the decisions of corporations, especially 
SOEs, in terms of resource allocation, strategic operational policy and ob-
jectives, and senior management appointments.188 Within the administrative 
corporate governance model, directors of SOEs are appointed directly by 
the Chinese government, and directors always retain certain administrative 
roles within the government while also acting as directors. The transfor-
mation of corporate governance is driven by internal and external forces 
which have legal, political, cultural and social impact through revised cor-
porate objectives, amended mechanisms for appointing members of boards 
of directors, and stronger reliance on market forces. The process of trans-
formation of Chinese corporate governance can be demonstrated by the fol-
lowing diagram, which shows the driving forces that lead to the economic 
result.  
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On this uncertain journey of corporate governance transition, both 
profit motives and the political motives of government officials under the 
administrative corporate governance model “have the potential to distort 
policy objectives significantly.”189 For example, the political targets of 
SOEs are not compatible with an economic development of corporate gov-
ernance, and are in conflict with economic targets of profit-making or prof-
it-maximisation. The government lacks adequate means to pursue corporate 
goals purely from the perspective that looking at corporations as vehicles of 
doing business, and “meta-agency” problems in government controlled and 
owned corporations. This may lead to the government failing to “seek to 
maximize the welfare of their principals,” which is the public; rather gov-
ernment officers may well prefer to maximize their own welfare or pursue 
other politically-oriented missions.190  
The corporate governance transformation is characterised, looking at 
the general trends, by the weakening of administrative governance and the 
strengthening of economic governance. However, this hybrid corporate 
governance model does retain many administrative characteristics, and it 
continues to be subject to strong government interference and reliance on 
government support and direction. It is also shaped by top-down bureau-
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cratic intervention and government control through the government’s con-
trolling power over corporate management, via agents appointed by the 
State who were previously government officials.191 The reforms and devel-
opments, such as corporatization and the convergence of corporate govern-
ance, have encountered serious challenges in China’s immature legal and 
institutional environment. The legal mechanisms that are traditionally seen 
as important in reducing agency costs, such as executive compensation con-
tracts, the risk of takeover and takeover mechanisms, the value of manage-
rial reputations and a well-functioning competitive market are all very im-
mature in China, especially in SOEs.192 Therefore, administrative 
governance could be necessary and functional due to underdevelopment of 
the legal infrastructure, loose law enforcement, and a problematic court sys-
tem which lacks a fully independent judiciary. Nevertheless, it has its own 
advantages at particular periods. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The article offers a systemic, historical, and rigorous study of Chinese 
corporate governance transformation, focusing on the development from a 
totally administrative model, one which relies on government and adminis-
trative power and imposes administrative duties and objectives of corpora-
tions’ controllers, to a hybrid model which has both administrative and eco-
nomic governance characteristics. This uniquely Chinese corporate 
governance consists of a set of customs, strategies, and institutions which 
are designed to mitigate or even eliminate double agency problems193 that 
arise as the result of separation of ownership and control and separate gov-
ernment functions from enterprise management.  
The role of market forces is still limited and restrained by political 
power and government interference in China. The existence and restrictions 
on state shareholders, state-controlled corporations, and SOEs hinder the 
development of the market for corporate control.194 We perceive that the 
state continues to have a key role in corporate governance in China which 
makes administrative interference and power something that is embedded in 
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the corporate governance regime through public and political policies, law 
enforcement, and the strategic management policies of each corporation. 
Apart from being a dynamic and vibrant process that needs to react to busi-
ness and political environmental variations, the transformation of corporate 
governance in China is one that involves a series of changes as a collective 
transformation including economic policies, and systems relating to leader-
ship, labor, wages, social security, ownership as well as political policies. 
Discussions on corporate governance transformation in a unique Chi-
nese context give us new insights into the reconceptualization of Chinese 
corporate governance, rather than just purely criticising lack of effective-
ness and efficiency of corporate governance because of administrative in-
volvement. The administrative involvement might sacrifice efficiency and 
effective market and corporate responses. However, it may bring compara-
tive advantages for Chinese corporate governance in terms of support, long 
term strategic planning, and the setting of multiple goals for SOEs, with 
government interference producing immediate effect to prevent market fail-
ure.  
The application of administrative power and administrative govern-
ance in the transformation of corporate governance might be seen, in many 
ways, as being justified, rational, and fair in the context of China. Likewise, 
government and administrative interference may also be regarded as ele-
ments that enhance and establish a sounder corporate governance, or even 
as ways that provide remedies for market failure. For future research, it may 
worth considering how administrative/government enhancement and judi-
cial intervention in corporate governance could be balanced.195 Moreover, 
to apply the discussion of the article in a wider context, the Chinese experi-
ence on administrative governance may provide some useful insights for 
both developing and transitioning economies seeking to establish capital 
markets and emerging markets in which government interference plays a 
vital role in financial and securities market. 
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